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Unfinished Business: The Fading Promise
of ADA Enforcement in the Federal Courts
Under Title I and its Impact on the Poor
Louis S. Rulli and Jason A. Leckerman*
Disability and poverty historically have traveled hand-in-hand. l Years of
exclusion from the workplace and most aspects of American life have left
people with disabilities socially isolated, poorly educated, and financially
dependent.2 Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)3 in
large part to end this relationship and to finally break down historic barriers that
have stood between people with disabilities and equal opportunity, financial
security, and economic independence.4 At the time of the passage of the ADA,
studies showed that almost 30% of people with work disabilities lived below the
poverty line5 and 45% of families headed by a person with a disability lived in
poverty.6 Yet, thirteen years after the passage of the ADA, the disabled remain
disproportionately poor.7 Today, people with disabilities are three times more
* Louis S. Rulli is a practice professor of law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Jason A. Leckerman, a 2001 graduate of the University of
Pennsylvania Law School, is a private lawyer currently practicing law in Philadelphia. The authors
wish to express their deepest gratitude to remarkably gifted, generous, and delightful law students,
Robert W. Ballenger and Loren G. Stewart, for their invaluable assistance with this article.
1. See 135 Congo Rec. 8506, 8506 (1989) (statement of Sen. Thomas Harkin).
2. See infra Part IlA.
3. 42 U.s.c. §§ 12101-12213 (1994); 47 U.S.c. § 225 (1994). Title I of the ADA, which
protects against disability discrimination in employment, went into effect on July 26, 1992, for
employers of twenty-five or more employees. 42 U.S.c. § 12111(5)(a). Employers of fifteen or
more employees came under the ADA on July 26, 1994. [d.
4. See infra Part n.A. See also Findings and Purposes of the ADA, 42 U.S.c. § 12101.
5. See 135 CONGo REC. 8506, 8506 (1989) (statement of Sen. Thomas Harkin) (discussing
1986 Harris survey).
6. See Poverty Trends, 1980-88: Changes in Family Composition and Income Sources
Among the Poor, Testimony before the Subcomm. on Human Resources. House Comm. on Ways alld
Means, 138 CONGo REC. D. 1088 (J 992) (Sept. 10, 1992) (statement of Richard L. Linster, Dir. of
Planning and Reporting, Program Evaluation and Methodology Division, U.S. General Accounting
Office), cited in Bob Dole, Are We Keeping America's Promises to People with Disabilities-
Commentary on Blanck, 79 IOWA L. REV. 925, 928 (J 994).
7. Elizabeth A. Pendo, Substantially Limited Justice?: The Possibilities and Limits of New
Rawlsian Analysis of Disability-Based Discrimination, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 225, 249 (2003).
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likely to live in povertl and their unemployment rates have remained relatively
constant.9
Indeed, despite measurable success in gaining access to public and private
institutions, people with disabilities still appear largely excluded from the
workplace. 10 Quite clearly, the ADA, through its main employment provision,
Title I, has not achieved nearly as much success in the workplace as many had
thought it would. ll Advocates for the disabled, who once heralded the ADA's
passage as a watershed moment in the history of civil rights, have been
relegated to accepting a number of set backs as de rigueur and finding solace in
the fact that the non-employment provisions of the Act have achieved more
success. I:! Thirteen years on, many fear that Title I of the ADA ultimately may
fail the worker (or the aspiring worker) with disabilities.
During the past half-century, the nation's federal courts have played a vital
role in protecting civil rights and combating illegal discrimination. 13 Private
parties and governmental agencies alike have turned to the courts to enforce
federal law and remedy irrational discrimination and, as a result, the judgments
of federal courts actions have empowered other victims of discrimination to
come forward and challenge illegal conduct. For Title I, however, federal
courts have not played this same, vital role in protecting the workplace rights of
people with disabilities. 14
In this article, we explore the relationship between enforcement of the
ADA in federal courts and the reasons that the ADA has not, so far, been as
successful in opening the doors of the workplace as many had hoped. In doing
so, we emphasize how the ADA's failure to live up to its potential in this
respect has had, and will continue to have, great ramifications for people who
are poor. We have divided the article into two parts. Part I analyzes the general
goals of the ADA and the success that the ADA has had in achieving those
goals. We begin our analysis by discussing Professor Thomas Stoddard's
thoughtful framework for analyzing legislation in which he identified the
narrow rule-shifting capacity and the much broader culture-shifting capacity of
Adding to this, is the stark fact that people without disabilities largely "are unable to identify with
people with disabilities ... [and] significantly and unreasonably devalue lives of people with
disabilities." [d. at 266-67. See also U.S. Census data from 2000, infra at note 168.
8. [d.
9. See infra Pan IT.A; see (lIsa infra note 163.
10. See infra note 163.
11. See infra Part I.B.
12. See id.
13. The most significant demonstration of this vital role is probably the Supreme Coun's
landmark decision in Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), which ended de jure racial
segregation in education.
14. See infra Part I.e.
I
I
I
I
I
I
1
I
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law. We conclude that the ADA was intended to be culture-shifting. Next, we
measure the success of Title I and the other provisions of the Act in achieving
this goal and conclude that the ADA, mainly due to the failure of Title I to play
its part, has only partially begun to fulfill its culture-shifting purpose and likely
will not be able to achieve this ultimate goal without substantial change. We
then address why Title 1's contributions to a culture shift have failed to
materialize. In doing so, we focus heavily on judicial outcomes in filed cases
under Title 1. We compare our findings with those of other published studies
assessing reported cases under Title I and conclude that, year after year,
employers continue to win in 92% to 97% of cases that reach a final judicial
outcome. We close the first part of our article by examining the impact that
such one-sided outcomes have on the willingness of lawyers to undertake new
federal litigation under Title I. Relying on current statistical evidence, we
conclude that lawyers are quickly retreating from Title I enforcement in our
federal courts.
In the second part of the Article, we look more closely at the nexus
between disability and poverty and ask whether the poor are able to confront
discrimination in the workplace by turning to the federal courts. We discuss the
special problems that the poor face in obtaining access to counsel and in trying
to litigate on their own. Once again, based on statistical evidence, we conclude
that poor people with disabilities have largely turned away from federal courts
as a means of enforcing their rights under Title I.
Finally, in an epilogue, we summarize our findings and offer some
suggestions that, if adopted, might bring us closer to the day when culture-
shifting change arrives in the workplace for people with disabilities.
I. THE FADING PROMISE OF TITLE I OF THE ADA
A. Congress Intended the ADA to Bring about a "Culture Shift"
In his essay Bleeding Heart: Reflections of Using the Law to Make Social
Change, Professor Thomas Stoddard JS offered the idea that the law has two
main capacities: "rule-shifting" and "culture-shifting."16 Measuring the ADA
against this standard provides a useful means for framing the analysis of the
efficacy of the Act's employment provisions. As will be seen, Congress and the
supporters of the ADA, in passing the Act, did not merely seek to establish new
rules governing the treatment of persons with disabilities: rather, they sought to
transform the way that people who have disabilities deal with society, and, in
15. Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflection on Using the Law to Make Social
Change, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967 (1997) (published posthumously).
16. /d. at 972-73.
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tum, how society treats people who have disabilities. The promise of
transformation, though, has gone largely unfulfilled. The fault for this
shortcoming lies mainly with Title I.
As Professor Stoddard described it, his essay blossomed from a
disappointing trip to New Zealand. 17 Prior to his trip, Professor Stoddard was
encouraged by his study of New Zealand's anti-discrimination laws, and how,
on their face, they appeared extremely progressive in the protections they
afforded gays and lesbians. 18 During his visit to the country, however,
Professor Stoddard discovered that the culture did not reflect the law. 19 Much
to his surprise (and chagrin), attitudes towards gays and lesbians in New
Zealand did not rival the level of cultural acceptance Stoddard believed was
present in the United States.20 Professor Stoddard reflected on the differences
and in his article he sought to make sense of them. He concluded that the law
mainly has two capacities: "rule-shifting" and "culture-shifting.,,21 The "rule-
shifting" capacity refers to laws enacted "[t]o create new rights and remedies
for victims," "[t]o alter the conduct of the government," or "[t]o alter the
conduct of citizens and private entities.',22 Professor Stoddard described these
goals as "the traditional role of the law in expressing the formal rulemaking
function for a society.,,23 The "culture-shifting" capacity of the law refers to
laws enacted "[t]o express a new moral ideal or standard" or "[t]o change
cultural attitudes and pattems.,,24 Professor Stoddard noted that these goals
portray the law as seeking "to advance the rights and interests of people who
have been treated badly by the law and by culture, either individually or
collectively, and to promote values we think of to be rights.,,25
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the "Civil Rights Act,,)?6 according to
Professor Stoddard, is the "statutory paradigm" of "culture-shifting"
legislation.27 In the Civil Rights Act, Congress prohibited discrimination based
on race, color, religion, national origin, and sex in most aspects of the American
17. {d. at 967-970.
18. {d. at 969.
19. {d. at 969-70.
20. !d. at 969-70.
21. Stoddard, supra note 15, at 972-73.
22. {d.
23. /d. at 972.
24. {d. at 972-73.
25. {d. at 973.
26. Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.c. § 2000 et
seq. (2000)).
27. Stoddard, supra note 15, at 973.
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experience, with "[the] most far-reaching and significant provisions
prohibit[ing] discrimination in public accommodations and publicly owned or
managed facilities (titles II and III), in programs receiving federal financial
assistance (title VI), and by employers, labor unions, and employment agencies
(title VII).,,28 The Civil Rights Act made available both public and private
enforcement.29
The Civil Rights Act achieved all five aims of the law, the three described
as "rule-shifting" and the two described as "culture-shifting." As Professor
Stoddard explained, "It gave victims of discrimination new rights and remedies.
It instructed the government to promulgate and enforce new rules of conduct for
itself. It altered the conduct of the private entities and citizens .... It expressed
a new moral standard. And ... it changed cultural attitudes.,,30 Explaining
further why the Civil Rights Act was more than a rule-shifting piece of
legislation, Professor Stoddard noted that the law did not "represent a recrafting
of the applicable rules and remedies"; "merely rewrite the canons of
employment law"; or "mean only that in the future, employers, merchants, and
the government (if law-abiding) would have to adhere to a new set of
guidelines.,,31 Rather, "[t]he Act brought into being a whole new model of
conduct that, consciously and deliberately, overturned doctrines embedded in
American culture-and, more widely speaking, European culture-for several
centuries,,,32 and its enactment "constituted a formal, national rebuke of th[e]
detestable, but time-honored concept" of "white privilege.,,33
The ADA likewise was intended to bring about a culture shift, as the
legislative history and the precise language employed by the law make clear.
Prior to the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act of 197334 constituted the primary
piece of federal legislation designed to protect the rights of the disabled.
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against persons
with a disability in federal programs or in the activities of recipients of financial
assistance from the federal government.35 Congress restricted the
Rehabilitation Act to "covered entities," a definition which did not reach into
28. See The Civil Rights Act of 1964,78 HARV. L. REV. 684, 684 (1965).
29. Id.
30. SLOddard, supra note 15, at 974.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Rehabilitation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified at 29 U.S.c. §§ 701-
796 (2000».
35. 29 U.S.c. §§ 793, 794.
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realm of private employment or affect completely non-public entities.36 As
ed, Professor Stoddard identified one of the three possible rule-shifting
ctions as "altering the conduct of the government.,,37 The Rehabilitation Act
this definition like a glove.
The legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act itself reveals its narrow
lis. The Report on the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 of the Senate Committee
Labor and Public Welfare explained the impetus for the Act:
Highlighted in these hearings were particular problems which may be
summarized as follows: (l) failure of the basic vocational
rehabilitation program to respond to the particular needs of
individuals with the most severe handicaps; (2) lack of alternative
services within the community to provide services to individuals with
the most severe handicaps who do not at the present time have
identifiable vocational goals but who could be brought to that point
through the provision of self-help services and training; (3)
diminution of emphasis at the Federal level on research and training
of personnel in rehabilitation problems, particularly in the areas of
medical technology and bio-medical engineering, and the failure of
the program to make use of existing technology for rehabilitation
needs; (4) the lack of special emphasis on target populations whose
needs were not being met through rehabilitation programs; (5) the
lack of action in areas related to rehabilitation which limit a
handicapped individual's ability to function in society, e.g.,
employment discrimination, lack of housing and transportation
services and architectural and transportation barriers, and (6) the
failure of leadership in the area of vocational rehabilitation by the
responsible Federal agency, the Rehabilitation Services
Administration .... Believing that it was necessary to emphasize that
the final goal of all rehabilitation services was to improve in every
possible respect the lives as well as livelihood of individuals served,
the Committee placed particular emphasis on developing a method of
providing services which would be responsive to individual needs and
would ensure that no individual would be excluded from the program
merely because his handicap appeared to be too severe.38
Discernibly, Congress intended that the Rehabilitation Act help alleviate
36. [d.
37. Stoddard, supra note IS, at 972.
38. S. REP. No. 93-318, at 3 (1973), reprinted ill 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2076, 2078-79
tereinafter Senate Report]. In its Report on the ADA, the House Committee on Education and
'lbor noted that "[s]everal witnesses also explained that title I of the ADA ... is modeled after
:gulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act." H.R. REP. No. 101-485(II)(l990), reprinted in
~90 U.S.C.CAN. 303, 315.
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limitations faced by persons with disabilities and foster rehabilitation programs
that would eliminate those limitations (hence the moniker "rehabilitation"), with
only a limited goal of addressing "employment discrimination, lack of housing
and transportation services and architectural and transportation barriers.,,39 The
narrow goal fossilized over time. Nearly twenty years after its passage, the
Rehabilitation Act was seen as a mere stepping-stone to the ADA.40
In the years following its enactment, the limitations of the Rehabilitation
Act became unacceptable. As Senator Harkin, one of the architects of the
legislation, explained:
In 1973, some 15 years ago, the Congress finally adopted section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits discrimination on the basis
of handicaps. However, this legislation only prohibits discrimination
by recipients of Federal aid. It does not cover discrimination by
private employers; nor does it prohibit discrimination in public
accommodations. Thus, today under our Nation's civil rights laws, an
employer can no longer say to a prospective employee, "I will not hire
you because of the color of your skin, or because you are a woman, or
because you are Jewish." If they did, a person could march over to
the courthouse, file a lawsuit, win and collect damages and attorney's
fees. Yet, to this day, nothing prevents an employer or an owner of a
hotel or a restaurant from excluding Americans with disabilities. The
courthouse door is still closed to Americans with disabilities.41
Supporters of the legislation consistently invoked this message, as
newspaper articles from the time detail,42 and similar words echo throughout
39. Senate Report, supra note 38, at 2078. In fact, the Senate Committee on Labor anJ
Human Resources noted in the legislative history that it was most concerned with only a portion of
the population with disabilities: "The Committee saw the need for definite legislation which would
not only provide more service for more people, but provide special emphasis on services to those
with severe handicaps. The focus of the Committee bill is very much on that group, and the burden
of reaching them has been placed squarely on the rehabilitation agencies throughout the bill." Id. at
2092. The Committee did note with some force, however, its desire that the Act address
employment opportunities within the federal government:
Federal employment policies with regard to handicapped individuals continued to be
found wanting. The Committee emphasizes that this equal opportunity must apply
fully to handicapped individuals. The Committee, therefore, expects the [Civil Service
Commission) to ensure that there is no discrimination in employment for handicapped
individuals within the Federal Government, and to take all necessary steps to ensure
that the special needs of handicapped individuals are met.
ld. at 2122. Still, the foclis of the legislation in the employment context is remarkable for its
narrowness.
40. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 107 (1989).
41. Harkin, supra note I, at *936.
42. See, e.g., H. Jane Lehman, Disabled Hoping New Law Will Improve Building Access:
Activists Say Coal Is Better Integration Into Society, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 1990, at E4.
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the legislative history and in the legislation itself. In its Report on the
legislation, the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources said the
following of the need for the legislation:
The Committee, after extensive review and analysis over a number of
Congresses, concludes that there exists a compelling need to establish
a clear and comprehensive Federal prohibition of discrimination on
the basis of disability in the areas of employment in the private sector,
public accommodations, public services, transportation, and
telecommunications.43
The Committee continued by stating that "[c]urrent Federal and State Laws
are inadequate to address the discrimination faced by people with disabilities in
these critical areas.',44 These views were adopted and incorporated into the
ADA in its "findings and purposes.,,45
Indeed, many people involved in the passage of the legislation noted the
vast indifference that the law exhibited towards the disabled at the time. For
instance, United States Attorney General Dick Thornburgh, testifying on behalf
of then-President Bush, stated: "Despite the best efforts of all levels of
government and the private sector and the tireless efforts of concerned citizens
and advocates everywhere, many persons with disabilities in the Nation still
lead their lives in an intolerable state of isolation and dependence.,,46 In its
report, the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources summarized the
current state of the country's treatment of persons with disabilities:
In sum, the unfortunate truth is that individuals with disabilities are a
discrete and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions
and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our
society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such
individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly
indicative of the ability of such persons to participate in and
'b . 47contn ute to SOCIety.
43. S. REP. No. 101-116 (1989) (A&P ADA Comm. Print 1990 28(A), at *103).
44. [d. at *104.
45. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,42 U.S.c. § 12101 (1994).
46. S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 9; see also, e.g., Jonathan M. Young, Equality of Opporruniry:
The Making of the Americans wirh Disabililies Acr, app. G (1997) available al hup://www.ncd.gov/
newsroom/publications/equality.html (reprinling President Bush's remarks upon signing the ADA:
'Three weeks ago we celebrated our nation's Independence Day. Today, we're here to rejoice in
and celebrate another 'Independence Day,' one that is long overdue. With today's signing of the
landmark Americans with Disabilities Act, every man, woman and child with a disability can now
pass through once-closed doors into a bright new era of equality, independence and freedom").
47. S. REP. No. 101-116 (A&P ADA Comm. Print 1990 28(A), at *113).
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The statistics in the Report summarize it even more forcefully:
"Individuals with disabilities experience staggering levels of unemployment and
poverty. [A]bout 8.2 million people with disabilities want to work but cannot
find a job.'A8 Perhaps no other quote best exemplifies the transformative
purpose of the ADA legislation than that of President Bush upon signing the
Act, when he referred to the passage as "an historic opportunity" and noted that
"it signals the end to unjustified segregation and exclusion of persons with
disabilities from the mainstream of American life.'A9 This statement reveals the
perceived problems that the Act was intended to address, and it shows the Act's
goal: integration into society.
Not only was Congress concerned with the rights of persons with
disabilities, it also wanted to tackle the way Americans interact with and refer to
people with disabilities. One of the more overlooked changes the ADA was
intended to bring about was in the vocabulary used by Americans. In the
legislative history, it is noted that the ADA aimed to eradicate the use of the
term "handicapped" and, with that, change the way that people refer to persons
with disabilities.50 As the Senate Committee noted in describing the definition
of the term "disability" found in the statute:
The use of the term "disability" instead of "individual with
handicaps" represents an effort by the Committee to make use of up-
to-date, currently accepted terminology. In regard to this legislation,
as well as in other contexts, the Congress has been apprised of the fact
that to many individuals with disabilities the terminology applied to
them is a very significant and sensitive issue.51
President George W. Bush echoed these sentiments in his commemoration
of the twelfth anniversary of the ADA, referring to the progress the ADA has
made: in treating people with disabilities "with dignity and respect" and
"chang[ing] attitudes that once seemed unchangeable.',52 Quite clearly, the
ADA was intended to change not only the lives of people with disabilities, but
also the lives of those not disabled-in other words, to bring about a culture
shift.53
48. Id.
49. Statement by President George Bush Upon Signing S. 933, 26 WEEKLY COMPo PRES.
Doc. 1165 (J uly 30, 1990).
50. S. REP. No. 10 J-116 (A&P ADA ConlIn. Print 1990 28(A), at *119).
51. la.
52. Press Release, The White House, President Commemorates 12th Anniversary of
Americans with Disabilities Act (July 26, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2002/07120020726-8.html.
53. See S. REP. No. 101-116 (A & P ADA Comm. Print 1990 (28A), at *1) ("This major
piece of civil rights legislation, passed overwhelmingly by the Congress, is designed finally to
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Perhaps the clearest evidence of the culture-shifting intent behind the ADA
is the fact that the ADA was largely modeled on the Civil Rights Act,54 i.e. the
paradigmatic example of "culture shifting" legislation.55 The legislative history
of the ADA contains a number of comparisons to the Civil Rights Act, with
many speakers likening the ADA's projected impact to that of the Civil Rights
Act. 56 The relationship manifests itself in the titles of the Act as well. The three
main titles, Titles I, II, and III, have sister titles in the Civil Rights Act.57 These
titles were, quite like the goals of the Civil Rights Act discussed above, aimed
at eradicating discrimination in employment and in access to both public and
private accommodations.
Given all of this, it can hardly be gainsaid that Congress had a "culture-
shifting" purpose in passing the Act. And, most important for the purposes of
this article-as we emphasize in a later section-the group that most expected
(and welcomed) this culture shift consisted of people with disabilities who
suffer from poverty.58 Before we discuss how and whether the ADA has
impacted poor persons, however, we look to see if the "culture-shifting"
aspirations of the ADA have begun to bear fruit.
B. The ADA Has Only Partially Begun to Fulfill Its Promise
It may be too early to ask whether the ADA has brought about a shift in the
nation's culture. Such a transformative change, by definition, requires patience
extend full rights to a significant segment of our population who have been denied equal access for
too long. It is good for persons with disabilities and good for America."); Pendo, supra note 7, at
235 (referring to the ADA, as an anti-discrimination law, as a basic part of what Rawls described as
"property owning democratic society"-an "indispensable component of a basic structure that justly
distributes the benefits and burdens of social cooperation." (quoting Rawls). Moreover, the make-
up of the Act itself-specifically its main three titles-reveals the intended transformative nature of
the statute. Title I prohibits discrimination in the employment of persons with disabilities. See 42
V.S.c. § 12112. Title IT prohibits discrimination in state and local governmental services. See 42
V.S.c. § 12132. Title III prohibits discrimination in public accommodations operated by private
entities. See 42 V.S.c. § 12182. Looking at these three titles, it is easy to view them as parts of a
pyramid leading to integration at its tip. Title I establishes the foundation, bringing financial
independence to persons with disabilities. Title II takes the next step of opening up the doors of
public entities. Title III, in tum, opens the doors of private entities, a right that likely cannot fully
be taken advantage of without the benefits of Title I.
54. See, e.g., Harkin, supra note I, at *936; see also Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under
(he Americans wi(h Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 241 (2001) CADA employment
discrimination litigation is patterned on Title vn of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... and section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (section 504).").
55. Stoddard, supra note 15, at 973.
56. See, e.g., Harkin, supra note 1, at *936; see also Colker, supra note 54, at 241.
57. Compare Title IT, 42 U.S.c. § 2000a (2003), and Title VII, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e (2003), of
the Civil Rights Act wi(h Title I, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-117 (2003), Title II, 42 V.S.c. §§ 12131-150
(2003), and Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-189 (2003).
58. See infra Part II.
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lasting beyond thirteen years. Nevertheless, the question remains: is the ADA
even moving in the intended direction? To answer this question, we divide the
ADA into two main parts. One part applies to employment rights, set out in
Title 1,59 and the other applies to rights of access, those rights set out more or
less in the other titles of the Act.60 In analyzing the two parts,· it becomes
evident that the titles other than Title I have had much greater success than Title
1. The nation's culture has not been "shifted" completely, but, thanks to the
titles other than Title I, it has nudged in that direction. Unfortunately, given the·
state of litigation under Title I of the ADA, the culture will not likely shift much
further. Title I has failed to lay the necessary foundation for that shift.61
1. Non-Title I Rights
Although it is difficult to apply Professor Stoddard's criteria in a precise
manner, it is apparent that the non-employment provisions of the Act-
primarily rights of access-have begun to play their respective parts in
changing American culture. Professor Stoddard identified four factors that
"must be engaged" before "ruleshifting" becomes "culture-shifting":
1. A change that is very broad or profound;
2. Public awareness of that change;
3. A general sense of the legitimacy (or validity) of the change; and
4. Overall, continuous enforcement of the change.62
According to Professor Stoddard, if all four are not engaged, only "rule
shifting" has occurred.63 Beginning with rights to access, application of the
factors identified by Professor Stoddard shows that the non-Title I rights have
had success in helping to lay the foundation for a "cultural shift."
A change that is very broad or profound. Even at this early stage, it
seems clear that the non-employment titles have begun to bring about "a change
59. 42U.S.C§§ 12111-117.
60. The nomenclature employed in this paper-employment rights and rights of access-is
not entirely accurate. Although Title I contains the chief protections in the employment realm, Title
n contains those protections as they apply to federal, state, and local governments. See 42 U.S.C §
12132 (2003). With this explanation in mind, we will employ these terms throughout this paper.
6l. See Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 20 (2000) ("Indeed, almost a decade after its enactment, the
judicial landscape dealing with claims of employment discrimination under the ADA looks far more
bleak than one might expect, given the ambitious hopes placed on the ADA and the celebration that
accompanied its enactment.").
62. Stoddard, supra note 15, at 978.
63. Id. at 978.
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that is very broad or profound." The breadth of the change in accommodations
for the disabled is remarkable; accommodations for the disabled are seen in all
aspects of daily life, from electronic lifts on buses, designated areas for
wheelchairs on buses and trains, elevators leading to subways, ramps leading to
restaurants and stores, curb cuts in streets, wider bathrooms, the proliferation of
elevators, municipal transportation services whose sole purpose is to help the
disabled, schools, and reserved seating areas at concert arenas, sporting arenas,
and theaters. As one commentator has written:
Buildings are more accessible. Community actIvltles are more
communications-accessible. Transportation is more accessible.
Assistive technology, the great equalizer for people with disabilities,
is more accessible. The images of people with disabilities are
changing as they are seen as consumers in print and broadcast ads,
and as they are elected to public office.64
Of course, great strides still must be made to ensure access for people with
disabilities, but the foundation has been laid. 65
Public awareness of that change. According to Professor Stoddard,
"Ordinary citizens must know that a shift has taken place for that shift to have
cultural resonance.,,66 Without conducting a poll, it is difficult to determine
whether ordinary citizens are aware of changes in accommodations.
Nonetheless, given the visibility and pervasiveness of the changes noted above,
it seems highly unlikely that they have gone unnoticed by the public even if
most people are unaware that the ADA deserves credit for these
accomplishments. Passengers of buses and trains no doubt note the increased
use by persons with mobile disabilities and observe the signs that say something
along the lines of "federal law requires the accommodation of disabled
passengers." Often, drivers or people working in public transportation help
those with disabilities to board and ensure that they are safely accommodated.
The same can be said for shoppers and diners. The changes are unmistakable.
Awareness of these changes seems to extend to smaller communities as well.
The Disability Rights Section of the U.S. Department of Justice, in examining
64. John M. Williams, The Business of the ADA is Business (Sept. J3, 200 I), available at
http://www.nod.org/contenLcfm?id=463.
65. Since the tenth anniversary of the passage of ADA, a number of newspaper articles have
documented the perception that society has become more accessible than it was in 1990. See, e.g.,
Peter G.:ier, Americans with Disabilities Act rums 12, DAlLY RECORD (B-altimore, MD) July 27,
2002; see also Ruth Calker, supra note 54, at 240 (citing Ruth Calker, ADA Title llJ: A Fragile
Compromise, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 377 (2000) (stating that "ADA enforcement can be
credited with improvements in the accessibility of public accommodations."). Our similar
conclusion that great strides have been made should not be confused with a conclusion that society
has become accessible to people with disabilities. Society still has a long way to go in this regard.
Our point simply is that we can see a foundation being laid for the eventual transformation.
66. Stoddard, supra note 15, at 980.
I
\
\
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the extent of compliance with Title II, has concluded that "the vast majority of
communities are aware of their ADA obligations.,,67
A general sense of the legitimacy (or validity) of the change. According
to Professor Stoddard, "[a]wareness must be accompanied by public
acceptance-which must inevitably be grounded in a sense of legitimacy or
validity.,,68 A recent poll conducted by Louis Harris Associates ("Harris")
shows that the ADA still has the support of "[0] verwhelming majorities of
Americans-79% to 88%.,,69 According to the poll,
Fully 88% of all adults support the principle that "public places like
restaurants, hotels, theaters, stores and museums may not discriminate
against customers on the basis of disability." However, those who
support it are down from 95% four years ago to 88% now, and those
who oppose it have increased from 4% to 8%.
Fully 87% of the public supports the principle that "new public
transportation vehicles must be accessible to people with disabilities."
But here again, support has slipped four points from 91 % four years
ago.70
Despite slight decreases in support, the fact remains that an overwhelming
majority of Americans support the rights to access laid out in the ADA and this
support has remained relatively consistent over time; thus, the Act's legitimacy,
. I' 1 1 . d 7110 t 1JS respect, seems arge y unquestlOne .
Overall, continuous enforcement of the change. As Professor Stoddard
notes, "Rules that are not enforced, particularly if they are dramatic or
controversial, will simply be disregarded by all or part of the public."n
Enforcement, however, like the other criteria, is difficult to measure. Still, there
are some clear indications that the rights of access are being enforced. In many
areas, requirements of access are continually enforced through building code
67. Project Civic Access Fact Sheet (last updated Sept. 4, 2003), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crtladaicivicfac.htm;seealsoLeonoreSchwager.13YearsojtheADA.Still
Much More Work 10 Do, THE ITHACA J. (July 10,2003).
68. Stoddard, supra note IS, at 982.
69. The Harris Poll #41, Thirteenth Anniversary oj the Americans wilh Disabilities ACI (ADA)
(July 26, 2003), al http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID= 390. The Poll did
note, howe vcr, that the kcy components of the ADA have suffered "some erosion in support and an
incrcase in the small number of people who do nOl support them." ld.
70. ld.
71. This fact is extraordinary considering the popular media's well-documented negative
portrayal of Title I. See Cary LaCheen, Achy Break;' Pelvis, Lumber Lung and Juggler's Despair:
The POrlrayal oj the Americans wilh Disabilities Act on Television and Radio, 21 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LA8. L. 223 (2000); Ruth Co1ker, The Americans wilh Disabilities Act: A Windjall jor
Dejendal7ls, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 99-101 (1998).
72. Stoddard, supra note 15, at 986.
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84four years ago.
Discussing this decline in public awareness, the report on the poll notes:
Polls, and pollsters, are better at describing changes in opinion than at
explaining it. However, it is normally true that awareness of
something declines if not frequently covered in the media. We
suspect that there has been less said and written in the media about the
Americans with Disabilities Act over the last four years, since our
1999 survey, than there had been previously.85
The statistics as to the awareness of Americans with disabilities speak for
themselves and certainly belie any noti6n that the ADA will achieve the
intended culture shift. 86 Moreover, there seems to be no trend toward
enforcement. As we detail in Part J.D, enforcement of Title I rights, as
measured by case filings, has experienced a substantial downward trend-
undermining any chance that Title I will help the ADA obtain its "culture-
shifting." 87
C. Why Has Title I Failed to Contribute to a Cultural Shift?
Although an exhaustive list is beyond the scope of this Article, some
reasons for the failure of Title I to live up to its promise are apparent. One of
the reasons among the most frequently cited by commentators for the
disappointment in Title I is the constraining judicial interpretation of the
statute.88 The Supreme Court has narrowly defined many of the Act's
provisions, which, in tum, has increased the scope of employer protection from
84. The Harris Poll #41, supra note 69. The report goes on to say:
Awareness is one thing and support for the principles is something else. And it is more
difficult to account for the modest decline in the high levels of support for the key
provisions of the ADA. It is certainly possible that this also is a result of less media
coverage of disability rights and issues. One possible explanation is that, in the
absence of media coverage. marc people do not think that there is a problem that
needs to be addressed and therefore do not support government regulations to address
it.
Id.
85. [d.
86. See also Diller, supra note 6 J. at 20 (2000) C'Still, there are reasons to fear that. at least in
the area of employment, the ADA has not yet had the transformative impact that its supporters
predicted.").
87. See infra Part J.D.
88. See National Council on Disability, The Americans \"v'ith Disabilities Act Policy Brief
Series:Righting the ADA, No.7: The Impact of the Supreme Court's ADA Decisions on The Rights of
Persons WiTh Disabilities (Feb. 25, 2003), available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/
decisionsimpact.html.
I
I
\
I
I
I
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liability and decreased the scope of employee protection from discrimination far
more than many advocates believe was intended.89 An analysis conducted by
the National Council on Disability has determined that "as a result of the
Supreme Court's definition cases, the lower courts have" construed the Act
even more narrowly.90 It points to decisions that have:
-ruled that persons who use mitigating measures are not protected by
the ADA;
-ruled that persons whose impairments could be mitigated by
medication are not protected by the ADA;
-made it much more difficult for individuals to establish that they are
substantially limited in the major life activity of working;
-required individuals to prove not only that they are substantially
limited in major life activities, but in "activities central to daily life";
-made it almost impossible for individuals to establish that they fall
within the "regarded as" prong of the ADA's definition of
d· b'l' 91lsa 1 lty.
Other commentators have lamented the Supreme Court's treatment of the
ADA as well,92 and some have said that the Supreme Court has been downright
89. The so-called narrowing-definition cases are: Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v.
Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) (concluding, inter alia, that (I) to be substantially limited in
performing manual tasks, an individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts
the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people's daily lives; (2)
the impairmeI1l's impact must also be permanent or long term; and that (3) it is insufficient for an
individual attempting to prove disability status to merely submit evidence of a medical diagnosis of
an impairment, but rather must show how the disability affects her directly); Albertson '.I', Inc. v.
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999) (concluding that (1) individuals with monocular vision are not
per se "disabled" within meaning of the ADA but, rather, must prove their disability on a case-by-
case basis by offering evidence that the extent of the limitation on a major life activity in terms of
their own experience is substantial, and that (2) former employer could use its compliance with'
applicable DOT safety regulations to justify its visual-acuity job qualification standard, despite
existence of experimental program by which DOT standard could be waived in an individual case);
Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999) (concluding that the ADA's
determination whether employee's impairment "substantially limits" one or more major life
activities is made with reference to the mitigating measures he employs); Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (concluding that corrective and mitigating measures should be considered
in determining whether individual is disabled under ADA).
90. See l ational Council on Disability, supra note 88.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Charles B. Craver, The Judicial Disabling of the Employment Discrimination
Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 18 LAB. LAW. 417 (2003); Katherine R. Annas,
Toyoca Motor Manufacturing, Kentuc/...-y, Inc. v. Williams: Parr of an Emerging Trend of Supreme
Court Cases Narrowing the Scope of the ADA, 81 N.C. L. REV. 835 (2003).
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hostile towards the ADA.93
The effect of these constraining decisions has been intensified by two other
Supreme Court decisions affecting Title I enforcement in other respects. In
Board of Trustees of the University ofAlabama v. Garrett, the Court concluded
that plaintiffs may not sue states under Title I of the ADA.94 This ruling
significantly narrowed the number of employees protected by placing them
outside of its umbrella state employees. In Buckhannon Board and Care Home,
Inc. v. West Virginia Dep't of Health and Human Resources,95 the Court
determined that the right to obtain attorney's fees under the fee provisions in
anti-discrimination statutes, such as the ADA, required that the underlying
litigation result in a court-sanctioned change.96 This departed from the
predominant "catalyst theory," under which a party that began litigation
resulting in a positive change was entitled to fees. By narrowing the types of
outcomes that would support a court award of fees, the incentive for lawyers
has diminished as well.
Two other contributing causes seem fairly obvious as well. One is the
expense of enforcing Title I rights through litigation. Title I litigation
necessarily involves extensive discovery and, often, the use of vocational and
medical experts, and often other experts. It simply may be too costly for
persons with disabilities, and their lawyers, to enforce rights under Title I in
many instances. 97 The other possible contributing cause is the likelihood that
misinformation or disinformation has contributed to the disappointing lack of
enforcement of Title 1. Several commentators have identified and debunked
popular misconceptions that seem to pervade the public's understanding of the
ADA.98 For instance, Professor Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr. has identified sixteen
myths, most of which apply to Title 1.99 These include the perceptions that: the
93. In fact, it has been reported that Supreme Court Justice O'Connor has taken the unusual
step of publicly criticizing the ADA as poorly written. See Patricia Manson, PlaintiffAttorneys See
ADA as Growing Infirm, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 26,2003, at I].
94. Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,374 (2001).
95. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S.
598, 600 (200 I).
96. Jd.
97. R. Pepper Crusher, Jr., Disability Law and Employer Policies in i\!/ississippi, 62 MISS. L.J.
665, 687-88 ("We who have cut our teeth on Title VII and National Labor Relations Act doctrine
will find that the ADA compels us to become much more interdisciplinary. We must learn how to
work with occupational rc;habilitation specialists, orthopedists, and psychiatrists. ").
98. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Myths and Facts aboUl the Alllericam wi1h Disabilities
AC1, available [l{ http://www.usdoj.gov/cn/adaJpubs/mythfcuxt (last visited Sept. 19, 2004) ('The
overwhelming majority of the complaints received by the Justice Department have merit."); U.S.
Dep't of Labor, Dispelling Myths about 1he Americans with Disabilities Act, available at
http://www.dol.gov/odcp/archives/ek96/lawmyth.htm (last visited Sept. 19,2004).
99. Professor Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr. for the National Council on Disability, The Americans
r
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ADA includes affirmative rights (as opposed to prohibitions against
discrimination); an applicant for a job who has a disability must be given an
advantage over other applicants; it is easy to qualify as "disabled" under the
Act; the ADA absolutely protects an employee who has a disability from being
fired; the ADA prevents an employer from disciplining an employee who has a
disability; and complying with the ADA is prohibitively costly. 100 These
myths, no doubt, contribute to the reluctance of some employers to proactively
comply with the ADA, and, moreover, they likely harden an employer's
opposition to the ADA and shape the employer's litigation posture.
D. Title I Litigation Outcomes
All of these reasons, however, might matter little if more plaintiffs were
able to successfully enforce their rights under Title I. The statistics, however,
show that the majority of Title I plaintiffs experience only de minimis success.
In 1998, the American Bar Association's Commission on Mental and
Physical Disability Law (the ''ABA Commission") began publishing annual
surveys on the outcomes of employment cases under Title 1. 101 The surveys
involved cases available in traditional legal reporters, found in online databases,
or brought to the attention of the ABA Commission by the media. 102 The most
recent survey shows that employers prevailed-i.e., the employee's complaint
was dismissed or the employer won on the merits-in 94.5% of the Title I cases
studied. 103 This success rate has remained at the same, or about the same, level
since the 1998 survey, which repolted that employers prevailed in 94.4% of the
Title I cases. 104 According to the author of the most recent survey report, Amy
L. Albright, the statistics "clearly show a continuation of the pattern of
employers prevailing and employees losing in an overwhelming majority of the
with Disabilities Act Policy Brief Series: Righting the ADA, No.5 Negative Media Portrayals of the
ADA (Feb. 20, 2003), available at http://www.ned.gov/newsroom/publieations/2003/negativemedia.
hun.
100. Id. Most disturbing is the possibility that employers are simply choosing to ignore the
requirements under the ADA. Given the astounding success rates that employers have at the
administrative, trial, and appellate levels, employers might simply decide that under a strict
monetary cost-benefit analysis, it does not "pay" to attempt to comply with the ADA, even if the
cost is relatively minimal. At least one defense lawyer has intimated that this may be the
appropriate result of a "risk analysis." 8urton J. Fishman, ADA: Much Ado aboLll NOlhing, 9 NO.4
HR ADVISOR: LEGAL & PRAC. GUIDANCE 37 (July/Aug. 2003).
10 1. Amy L. Albright, 2002 ElilpluYllfent Decisions Under the ADA Title I 8 Sun'l'y Update,
27 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABIl.lTY 1.. REP. 387, 387 (2003). The ABA Commission also looked
at EEOC statistics on Title 1 administrati ve complaints. Employees faired better in administrative
adjudications, though certainly not well, prevailing in 21.9% of the cases resolved on the merits. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Jd at 389.
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to. I ,,105lOa court outcomes.
The statistics found in the ABA Commission's surveys are consistent with
those compiled by Professor Ruth Colker in her highly regarded study of
judicial outcomes under Title 1. 106 Professor Colker determined that, of cases
available on Westlaw from 1992-1998, defendants prevailed in more than
92.7% of ADA employment discrimination cases decided on the merits at the
trial court leve1. 107 Putting these figures in perspective, studies of litigation
outcomes show that under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
defendants prevailed in 80% of cases litigated to a final outcome 108 and that,
overall, defendants prevail in 42.03% of all civil cases filed in federal court. 109
Making matters worse, prevailing Title I plaintiffs experience a similar
lack of success at the appellate level. Professor Colker determined that
employers prevailed in approximately 84% of the appellate cases reported on
Westlaw during 1992-1998. 110 In a more recent study, Professor Colker has
determined that "[d]efendants attain a full reversal in 42% of appellate litigation
and obtain a reduction in the damages award in an additional 17.5% of cases,"
while "[p]Iaintiffs, by contrast, obtain a reversal of a pro-defendant judgment in
only 12% of cases."lll Again, putting these figures in perspective, Professor
Colker determined that Title VII plaintiffs obtained a reversal in 34% of the
cases they appealed.1 12 Neatly summarizing her studies, Professor Colker
concluded that "plaintiffs appear to fare worse at the trial court and appellate
court levels under [Title I of] the ADA than in other areas of the law."lI3
What is more, the outcomes of these studies seem to parallel an analysis of
filed cases. In a previous article, we examined filed cases in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ("Eastern District of
Pennsylvania"), in part in an effort to try to examine the "whole universe" of
Title I cases so that we could determine if the studies of reported cases were
105 Id at 387.
106. Colker, supra note 71, at 109.
107. Id.
108. George Rutherglen, From Race ro Age: The Expanding Scope of Employment
Discrilllinarion Law, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 491, 513 (1995); see also Sharona Hoffman, Corrective
Justice and Title I of the ADA, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1213, 1216 (2003) (analyzing this study).
109. Rulli. supra note 75, at 368; bur see Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case
Outcomes Really Ret'eal Anything Abolll {he Legal System? Win Rales and Removal Jurisdiction, 83
COR 'ELL L. REV, 581, 581 (1998) (calling win rate studies "the slipperiest of all judicial data")
Since many claims are withdrawn or settled prior to judgment, official outcomes alone are viewed
by some to be limited in value. See id. at 586-87.
110. Calker, supra note 7I, at 108.
111. Colker, supra note 54, at 248-49.
112. Id. at 248, 253.
113. Id. at 257.
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indeed representative. 114 The Eastern District of Pennsylvania sits primarily in
Philadelphia, but also conducts hearings elsewhere and serves the residents of
ten Pennsylvania counties. Highly regarded for the quality of its bench and bar,
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has a busy docket of ADA cases, when
compared to other district courts for which statistics are available. l ! 5. The
Eastern District of Pennsylvania is an excellent district for conducting the study
because it has a great many legal services and public interest organizations and
law firms, including a larger than average number of employment lawyers as
well as an employment panel from which the district court may appoint counsel
for pro se litigants. ll6 Studying filed cases is important because it allows for
close examination of who is filing suit (which we discuss in more detail in Part
II) and how the courts are treating their cases. To examine filed cases in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, we obtained the official docket sheet for each
case involving an ADA employment claim so that we could look at pleadings
and outcomes. 1l7 We were able to isolate Title I claims by utilizing
identifiers l18 that plaintiffs included in the civil cover sheet required for each
filing. 1l9 In our initial study, we looked at filings from 1996-1998. 120 Of the
cases concluded by way of judicial determination, we found that only 2.7% of
Title I plaintiffs prevailed,121 thus yielding an extraordinary 97.3% success rate
for employers. 122
For this article, we have updated the study by analyzing filed-case
1J4. See Rulli, supra note 75. Although Professor Rulli wrote the article, the pronoun "we"
will be used for ease of reference.
115. See infra Part LD.
116. See infra Part II.B.
117. In the initial study, the clerk's office helped us to identify the appropriate court docket
number to obtain all dockets. In the updated study, we used the court's electronic court filing
system, known by the acronym PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records). See
http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/pacerdesc.html. We found that, in regard to the ability to search case
filings, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was well ahead of most other districts. In examining
cases filed during a given year, we declined to count cases that had been re-opened during that year
to avoid double counting-case filings were allocated only to the year in which they were originally
filed. The statistical information from the PACER system is based on the data available at the time
of our research, and may not reflect any updated data that the federal courts have added to the
PACER system subsequent to our review.
118. These identifiers were the "nature of suit" and "statute" as listed in the Electronic Court
filing System.
119. Accordingly, there is a chance thaI there are more Title I cases, but that these were
misidentified by plaintiffs.
120. See Rulli supra note 75, at 368.
121. /d. That is, those cases that ended on a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12, a motion under
Fed R. Civ. P. 56, or a verdict.
122. [d.
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outcomes in 2000 and 2001. Our updated study has revealed little change.
Plaintiffs succeeded at least partially in 8% of cases, but, in real numbers, this
consisted of full or partial victories in only two of twenty-five Title I cases
during 2000-2001, representing an employer victory rate of 92%. Consistent
with the study of reported cases, the vast majority of plaintiffs lose at the
motion to dismiss or summary judgment stages. 123 The importance of this last
figure is critical considering that such "nontrial adjudications" constitute 50%
percent of all filed cases in federal court. 124
Quite clearly, measured by judicial outcomes, the state of things under
Title I of the ADA for all people with qualifying disabilities may be summed up
succinctly as a promise not much closer to fulfillment than it was thirteen years
ago. The studies of reported cases, appellate cases, and filed cases show that, as
many have concluded, enforcement under Title I, from the worker's
perspective, is largely a loser's game. And, as perpetual losers in Title I
litigation, plaintiffs ultimately will fail to bring about the intended cultural
shift. 125
E. Lawyers Are Being Driven Away from Title I
Considering all of this, it is not surprising to learn that it appears that
lawyers are being driven away from litigating under Title I. The National
Council on Disability has referred to a "chilling effect" on lawyers. 126 But, the
reality may be much worse. Our study of case filings in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania and other jurisdictions found a precipitous decline in Title I
enforcement over the last five years that sharply contrasts with upward trends in
non-employment ADA litigation, Title VII litigation, and disability
discrimination charges filed with the EEOC.
The statistics show unequivocally thar significantly fewer Title I cases are
being filed. Our study measured filings in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
from 1996 through 2003, with the figures for 2003 through December 1 of that
year. The following chart summarizes the findings:
123. Albright, supra note 101, at 387 (noting that only 3.9% of "employer 'victories'" were
"resolved on the merits"). In twenty of the twenty-five cases filed and litigated to final outcomes
during 2000-200 I, the defendant-employer won on a motion to dismiss or at the summary judgment
stage, and only three of the twenty-three employer verdicts occurred at or after trial.
124. Adam Liptak, U.S. Suirs Mulriply, iJw Fewer £ver Get to Trial, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES.
Dec. 14,2003, at AI.
125. By emphasizing judicial outcomes. we do not mean to discount the important benefits
obtained by plaintiffs in informal settlements reached in Title I litigation. However, as described in
our previous article, such benefits are difficult, if not impossible, to measure because of
confidentiality and other factors. See Rulli, supra note 75, at 373-375.
126. National Council on Disability, supra note 88, at 15.
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Year No. of Title I Cases Filed in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania
1996 S6
1997 72
1998 9S
1999 124
2000 98
2001 64
2002 70
2003 63
(through 12/0 I /03)
The result is a bell curve. In 1996, plaintiffs filed fifty-six claims in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania under Title 1. The number of filings reached
its zenith in 1999-the year the Supreme Court decided the "Sutton trilogy" that
interpreted the ADA narrowlyl27-with 124 filings under Title 1. Between
1996 and 1999, therefore, the number of filings increased 121.4%. By
December 1, 2003, however, the number of filings fell to 63-a decrease of
49.2% from the 1999 peak. Therefore, even in a highly active district with a
number of resources available for plaintiffs, attempted enforcement has
substantially ebbed over the last four years. In order to place these findings in
perspective, we also studied other districts. The largest of the districts, and the
one most comparable to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, was the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York ("Southern District
of New York"). The Southern District of New York sits primarily in
Manhattan, but also conducts hearings elsewhere, and serves the residents of
eight counties. Like the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, it is located in what is
considered a hotbed for legal activity, with an immense number of law firms,
127. The so-called "Suflon trilogy" consists of Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555
(1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); and Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), and is commonly considered to have resulted in a precipitous drop in
efforts to enforce Title I protections. See generally Diller, supra note 61, at 19.
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and legal services and public interest organizations. The following chart
summarizes our findings:
Year No. of Title I Cases Filed in the
Southern District of New York
1998 39
1999 76
2000 66
2001 24
2002 16
2003 (through 1211/03) 4
These statistics reveal trends that are remarkably similar to those for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Between 1998 and 1999, filings increased
94.9%. Between 1999 and December 1, 2003, however, filings fell an
astounding 94.7%. From these statistics, the same conclusion may be drawn as
was drawn for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania: attempted enforcement has
substantially ebbed over the last four years. To further test these findings to see
whether the Eastern District of Pennsylvania statistics may be considered
illustrative of the general state of enforcement under Title I, we studied nine
other federal district courts for which filing statistics were available through the
Case Management Electronic Court Filing System. 128 Of these districts, the
District Court for Northern Indiana ("Northern Indiana"), the District Court for
Eastern Missouri ("Eastern Missouri"), the District Court for Western Missouri
("Western Missouri"), and the District Court for Southern Ohio ("Southern
Ohio") had the largest number of filings, and were the only districts with more
than 200 Title I filings from 1996-2003. 129 Accordingly, we included only
128. The other District Courts available at the time of study were the following: Northern
Indiana, Kansas, Eastern Kentucky, Maine, Eastern Missouri. Western Missouri, Nebraska. Western
New York. and Southern Iowa. Accordingly, the study was restricted to those courts that had
searchable online databases at the time we began the study.
129. We did not use the statistics for any of the other district courts referred to in footnote 128
because we did not feel that they offered a significant enough number of filings over the eight-year
period. The total number of filings in any of the five district courts did not come within 40 filings
of the four districts we have focused on.
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these districts as a part of the study. As we note in the margin, 130 these districts
differ from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and Southern District of New
York in that they are not centered in cities nearly as densely populated (both
with people and lawyers) as Philadelphia or Manhattan. The following chart
summarizes our findings:
Year No. of Title I No. of Title I No. of Title I No. of Title I
Cases Filed in Cases Filed in Cases Filed in Cases Filed in
Northern Eastern Western Southern
Indiana Missouri Missouri Ohio
1996 65 60 46 19
1997 42 60 42 26
1998 49 48 38 31
1999 52 40 20 32
2000 40 43 19 22
2001 32 52 30 32
2002 34 36 14 34
2003 31 25 9 19
(through
12/1/03)
These figures show a 40.4% decline in Title I cases filed over the fouf
years since 1999 in Northern Indiana, a 37.5% decline in Eastern Missouri, a
55% decline in Western Missouri, and a 40.6% decline in Southern Ohio. The
average decrease in filings since 1999 in all four of the districts was 43.38%.
This decline clearly paralleled the 48.4% decline in the Eastern District of
l30. The District Court for Northern Indiana has offices located in South Bend, Hammond,
Fort Wayne, and Lafayette, and serves the residents of thirty-two Indiana counties. The District
Court for Eastern Missouri mainly sits in St. Louis and serves the residents of twelve Missouri
counties. The District Court for Western Missouri is based in Kansas City but is divided into five
divisions: Western (Kansas City), Central (Jefferson City), Southern (Springfield), Southwestern
(Joplin), and St. Joseph (St. Joseph), and serves the residents of sixty-six Missouri counties. The
District Court for Southern Ohio serves the residents of forty-eight counties and has two divisions:
the Eastern Division sits at Columbus and the Western Division sits at Cincinnati and Dayton.
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Pennsylvania (though it was not as precipitous as the decline in the Southern
District of New York). From these figures, a clear picture of the state of Title I
enforcement in the country seems to emerge. People are simply not attempting
to enforce their Title I rights in federal courts to anywhere near the extent they
did in 1999. This conclusion sharply contrasts with the recent determination
that litigation in general has increased in federal courts. 131
These contrasting trends play out at the administrative level as well. The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the administrative arm
of the Federal Government given enforcement power over the ADA, has also
decreased its litigation under the ADA. As the National Council on Disability
has documented, "[d]ata from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) shows that the number of ADA lawsuits filed by the EEOC decreased
significantly after the trilogy of ADA decisions in 1999 (Sutton, Murphy, and
Kirkingburg) and decreased again after the 2002 trilogy (Williams, Barnett, and
Echazabal)." 132 In contrast, "EEOC lawsuits filed under other federal
employment discrimination laws during those years increased." 133
The downward trend in Title I enforcement also contrasts sharply with the
trend in non-Title I ADA enforcement in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
A study of filed cases in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania shows a
substantial increase in filings since 2000. The following chart summarizes our
findings:
Year No. of Non-Title I Cases Filed
2000 22
2001 32
2002 34
2003 (through 12/1/03) 124
This represents a sharp 54.5% increase in litigation under titles other than
Title I under the ADA in a mere two years and an extraordinary 464% increase
in just three years. We caution, however, that this statistic may not be
representative of the state of non-Title I enforcement in general, considering
that the other districts we were able to study did not show nearly as drastic an
131. Liptak, supra note 124.
132. National Council on Disability, supra note 88.
133. [d.
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increase. 134 Still, those districts showed consistent enforcement, as opposed to
a substantial decrease, a trend that also contrasts with the downward trend in
Title I enforcement. 125
Finally, we looked at charge statistics for the EEOC for disability
discrimination available on the agency's website l36 to see if the decrease in
federal court filings might be explained by increased voluntary compliance with
Title I by employers and a resulting decrease in charges alleging disability
discrimination filed with the EEOC, i.e. to see if there was a comparative
decrease in potential Title I plaintiffs. This, however, was not the case, though
a slight decrease did occur. The following chart shows the statistics:
Year No. of Disability Discrimination Charges Filed
with the EEOC137
1999 17,007
2000 15,864
2001 16,470
2002 15,964
In 1999, the EEOC received 17,007 charges alleging disability
134. We also looked at non-Title I filings in Northern Indiana, Eastern Missouri, Western
Missouri, and Southern Ohio. The statistics for Southern District of New York were not available.
In all but one of the districts, the number of filings increased. Nonetheless, because the filings
averaged less than ten per year per district during the same period (2000-2003), we do not feel that
the number can be used as support for the notion that non-Title I filings have increased.
135. It is also worth noting that factors, mainly social and economic, outside the realm of the
law likely have had an impact on the ADA's progress. for instance, David M. Engel and Frank W.
M unger have identified a number of non-legal factors that influence whether a person with
disabilities is likely to invoke the ADA. According to the authors, there are "particular social
factors that tend to complicate or interfere with the effectiveness of the ADA's employment
provisions."' David M. Engel & Frank W. Munger, Re-iflfeprefing fhe Effect on Rights: Career
Nanmives <1l1d fhe Americans with Disahilifies ;\cr, 62 OHTO ST. L.J. 285, 330 (2001), including the
failure: of persons to "recognize that they hQve a disability as defined by the ADA," id.. the
individual's reluctance to reveal that she has a disability, iii., fear of a "backlash of resentment
among co-workers" for invoking rights, id. at 331. and lack of awareness of the rights under the
ADA. lei. Moreover, they concluded that race and class seem to have a profound effect, id., stating:
"[P]ersons of higher socioeconomic status and members of racial minorities are also unlikely... to
invoke the ADA." Id. at 312-13.
136. See EEOC Website, at http://www.eeoc.gov (last visited Sept. 19,2004).
137. EEOC, Chart, Number of Disability Discrimination Charges Filed with the EEOC, Qf
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges/htm1 (last visited Sept. 19, 2004).
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discrimination. For the last available year, 2002, the EEOC received 15,964.
This represents only a 6.1 % decrease in charges filed. Although the statistics do
not cover 2003, as the studies of federal court filings did, the percentage
decrease in charges (6.1 %) compared to the percentage decrease in filings in the
district courts studied (ranging from 37.5% to 94.7%) is so drastically different
that it seems safe to assume that any decline in charges in 2003 would not
approach the decline in cases filed in federal court. In any event, this point is
also illustrated if the case filings statistics are considered from 1999 to only
2002. The number of filings from 1999 to 2002 decreased in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania by 43.5%, in the Southern District of New York by
78.9%, and in the other four districts by a combined 18.1%-all much greater
than the 6.1 % decline in charges filed.
The decline in newly filed enforcement litigation, unaccompanied by an
equivalent decline in charges filed with the EEOC, brings into focus the fading
promise of Title 1. In many respects, a statute once seen as empowering has,
. b d' . 138 1 . I f+ d"over time, ecome Isempowenng. t certam y 0 lers a Istmct contrast to
the seemingly overwhelming impression that litigation under the ADA has
reached a breaking point of some sort. 139 Moreover, even if plaintiffs were
litigating more frequently under Title I, it is likely that little would change. A
plaintiff who does not settle would have nearly as good a chance of winning
playing roulette at a casino as she would bringing a Title I claim in court. 140 It
is painfully clear that Title I has not become the panacea for plaintiffs with
disabilities that many had hoped, and there is no reason to believe that Title I, as
it now stands, will soon, if ever, begin to effectuate much of a change in the
lives of persons with disabilities.
n. THE INTERTWINED FATE OF POVERTY, DISABILITY, AND TITLE I
ENFORCEMENT
If skewed litigation outcomes and restrictive judicial rulings cause private
lawyers to back away from enforcing Title 1 in federal court, what is the likely
impact upon poor people with disabilities, for whom the ADA holds special
138. Ruth Colker, The Death of Section 504, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 219, 220 (2002)
(arguing that the ADA has resulted in a narrowing of the ('ights available under Section 504 of the
Rchahilitation Act). Moreover, it seems that the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice
is not substantially filling in the gap either. It is well-documented that the current administration
has litigated substantially fewer employment discrimination cases than during the prior
administration. and has investigated substantially fewer investigations as well. Shannon McCaffrey,
Civil Rights Division Backs Awarji-omlnilial Activism, PHIL.". 1'lQUIRER, Nov. 23, 2003, at A8.
139. See also Colker, supm note 71, at 99 ("The popular media has often portrayed the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) as a windfall statute for plaintiffs.").
140. See Terrence R. Chorvat, Ambiguity and Tax Income, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 617,618 n. 9
(2002) ("Assuming a standard roulette wheel consisting of thirty-six numbers, the probability of the
ball landing on anyone number should be 1/36.").
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significance and promise? In the second part of this Article, we look more
closely at whether the disabled poor, whose fragile economic interests are most
tied to the success of the ADA, are engaged in fcderal litigation to ovcrcome
employment discrimination that restrains their progress toward economic
independence.
In our prior study, we examined case outcomes in civil actions filed under
the ADA between 1996 and 1998, and then looked at the litigants themselves
and the lawyers involved to gain a better understanding of who was turning to
our federal courts for enforcement of their federal rights under Title 1. 141 In so
doing, we acknowledged that the financial status of individual litigants is not
easily ascertained from court records, but that it is possible to obtain reliable
data on litigation activities of poor people by examining several indices related
to poverty. Our review of the number of in forma pauperis filings, the
associational relationships of counsel of record, and the nature of the
employment positions at stake, among other factors, led us to conclude in those
cases that there were "serious questions about the ability of the poor to enforce
their rights under Title I as long as legal representation is unavailable and
federal agency enforcement appears unresponsive." 142
In our CUlTent study, we reviewed similar poverty-related factors in all 295
employment discrimination cases filed under the ADA in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania between January I, 2000 and December I. 2003 to see if, over
additional time, the poor had obtained greater access to lawyers and to the
courts for the enforcement of their Title I rights. The results were
disheartening.
A. The Nexus Between Disability, Poverty and Unemployment
1. Being Disabled Increases the Likelihood of Bcing Poor
People with disabilities are much poorer than the rest of Americans. 143 On
the eve of the ADA's passage, individuals with disabilities experienced
staggering levels of unemployment and poverty.144 Surveys conducted by
Louis Harris found that not working was perhaps the "truest definition of what it
141. Rulli, supra note 75, at 375-84.
142. 1d. at 390.
143. Christine M. Tomko, The Economically Disadvantaged cmd the ADA: Why Economic
Need Should Factor into the /vfitigating Measures Disabi/ir" Analvsis. 52 CASE W. RES. L REV.
1033 (2002) (citing H.R. REP. O. 101-485, pt. 2, at 43-47). See also DEFINlTIO ' OF POVERTY:
MEASURING POVERTY: A NEW APPROACH (Constance F. Citro & Robert T. Michael. eds. 1995).
144. Tompko, supra note 143, at 1033.
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mean[t] to be disabled in America.,,145 Two-thirds of all disabled Americans
between the ages of 16 and 64 were not working at all, although 66% of those
not working stated that they wanted to work. 146 More than eight million people
with disabilities wanted to work but could not find a job. 147
The Harris poll summarized the financial condition of people with
disabilities: "By almost any definition, Americans with disabilities are uniquely
underprivileged and disadvantaged. They are much poorer, much less educated
and, have much less social life, have fewer amenities and have a lower level of
life satisfaction than other Americans.,,148
Employment discrimination has played a pernicious role in keeping people
with disabilities out of the workplace. Responding to a Harris poll, top
managers, equal opportunity officers, and department heads stated that they
believed that individuals with disabilities often encounter job discrimination
from employers, and that employment discrimination is an inexcusable barrier
to increased employment of disabled people. 149 Moreover, without
comprehensive legislation to combat disability discrimination in the workplace,
high rates of unemployment and poverty among the disabled were considered
likely to continue and remain unchallenged because the prevalent culture
accepted the general notion that "these are the inevitable results of disabling
conditions.,,150 These forces combined to make unemployment among persons
with disabilities a bigger problem than among any other demographic group of
working-age Americans. 151 In] 988, then Vice-President Bush described
people with disabilities as the "poorest, least educated and largest minority in
America.,,152
Individuals with disabilities voiced their plight in congressional hearings
preceding the passage of the ADA. The Committee noted:
A popular health guide quotes a woman as saying, "We are not
145. LOUIS HARRIS & ASSOCIATES, THE lCD SURVEY OF DISABLED AMERICANS: BRINGING
DISABLED AMERICANS INTO THE MAINSTREAJvl 50 (1986), cited in H.R. REP. NO. 101-485,
reprimed in 1990 V.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 314 (statement of Senator Harkin); 135 CONGo Rc:c. S10708-
01 (1989)(citing LOUIS HARRIS & ASSOCtATES, THE lCD SURVEY OF DISABLED AMERICANS:
BRINGING DISABLED AMERICANS INTO THE MAl STREAM 50 (1986)) (statement of Senator Harkin).
146. [d.
147. [d.
148. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: Hearing on S. 933 Before the Sel/ale SII!JC(J1II1I1.
on the Handicapped, 10 1st Congo 9 (1987) (testimony of Humphrey Taylor, Louis Harris and
Associates), reprinred in 1990 U.S.C.C.A..N. 303, 313.
149. 135 CONGo REC. S10708, SI0712 (1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
ISO. 135 CONGo REC. E1575-0 I (1989) (statement of Rep. Coelho).
151. [d.
152. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 32-33 (1990) (statement of Vice President Bush), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,314.
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disabled; it is society which disables us by being so unsupportive."
Perhaps this unsupportive attitude helps to explain the troubling
association between people with disabilities and poverty. The
average earnings for people with disabilities in 1980 was $6000,
compared with $11,300 for the non-disabled. About 7% of working-
age nondisabled households had family income below the poverty
level. By contrast, some 24% of the households with a family
member who was severely disabled had family income below the
poverty level (and that includes the help that they may get from the
1-3
government). )
The increased focus on the disparate financial plight of people with
disabilities fueled an urgent sense of legal and moral responsibility to remedy
historical wrongs that had cast the disabled into "virtual outcasts from the
mainstream of society: jobless, homeless, penniless, hopeless.,,154 In the words
of one witness, "[W]e are responsible to hundreds of thousands of our fellow
citizens who die, literally die, years and decades before their time.,,155
Congress understood this when it enacted the ADA, expressly finding that
"[c]ensus data, national polls, and other studies have documented that people
with disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and are
severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and
educational1y.,,156 Congress was determined that economic dependency not be
an inevitable consequence of having a disability,157 and that individuals with
disabilities be brought "into the economic and social mainstream of American
life,,158 by assuring "equality of opportunity, full participation, independent
living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals.,,159
The gateway to economic independence and self-sufficiency for people
with disabilities flows directly through Title I of the ADA and its promise of
ending disability discrimination in the workplace. Yet, more than twenty-five
years after the enactment of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and some
thirteen years after the passage of the ADA, individuals with disabilities
153. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearing on S. 933 Before the Senate Com/11.. on
Labor and Human Resources and the Senate Subcol1ll1l. on the Handicapped, 101st Congo 2nd Sess.
374(1989).
154. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearing on S. 933 Before the Senate Comm. on
Labor and HI/man Resources and the Senate Subcomm. on (he Handicapped, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
20 (1989).
155. 1eL. ~t 1041 (statement of Justin W. Dart, Jr., Ch~irperson, Task Force on the Rights and
Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities).
156. 42 U.s.c. 12101(a)(6)(2004).
157. Tomko, supra note 143, at 1048 (citing H.R. REP 0.101-485, pt. 2, at 39-41 (1990».
158. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 99.
159. 42 U.S.c. 12101 (a)(8)(2004).
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continue to experience among the highest unemployment rates and comprise the
largest number of people living in poverty of any group in American society.160
EEOC Commissioner Paul Steven Miller recently tied disability discrimination
to poverty when he cautioned that, "[b]arriers and stereotypes continue to
impede the integration of disabled people into the workplace." 161 An industrial
relations researcher concluded much the same when she found that
"[e]mployment and earnings levels are generally low among people with
disabilities in the United States. . .. While a portion of the employment and
earnings gaps may reflect lower productivity associated with many disabilities,
prejudice and discrimination also appear to playa role.,,162
There is ample statistical support for this conclusion. A 1998 Harris poll
of 1,000 individuals with disabilities aged sixteen and older found that disabled
people lag well behind other Americans in many of the most basic aspects of
life and that employment is the area with the widest gulf between those who are
disabled and those who are not. 163 The 1998 survey found that only three in ten
working-age adults with disabilities (29%) are employed full- or part-time,
compared to eight in ten non-disabled adults (79%).164 The survey found that
working age adults with disabilities are no more likely to be employed today
than they were a decade ago, even though almost three out of four who are not
working say that they would prefer to be working. 165 In addition, two out of
three adults with disabilities (67%) say that their disability has prevented (41 %)
or made it more difficult (26%) for them to get the kind of job [hey would like
to have. 166 Clearly, low employment rates among the disabled greatly
contribute to such a high incidence of poverty. 167
The national census conducted in 2000 reconfirmed that people with
160. Paul Steven Miller, Reclaiming the Vision: The ADA and Definition of Disability, 41
BRANDEIS L.J. 769, 770 (2003). Mr. Miller is Commissioner, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, and delivered these remarks as part of the Carl A. Warns Jr. Lecture on Labor and
Employment at the Louis D. Brandeis School of Law at the University of Louisville on June 6,
2002.
161. [d.
162. Lisa A. Schur, Barriers or Opporlllnities? The Causes of Conrillgent and Part-Time Work
Among People wirh Disabiliries, 42 1"1DUS. REL. 589, 591 (2003).
163. See 1998 National Organization on DisabilitylLouis Harris & Associates Survey of
Americans with Disabilities, July 23, 1998, Executive Summary, available ar hnp:!/www.nod.org/
presssurvey.html (visited 10/22/99) (on file with authors). This was the first national poll taken by
Harris in cooperation with the National Organization on Disability since 1994, and the third
conducted by Harris since 1986.
164. Id.
165. [d.
166. [d.
167. Barbara Vobejda, Survey Finds No Job Gains for Disabled, WASH. POST, July 23,1998,
atA20.
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disabilities are significantly more likely to be impoverished than people without
disabilities. 168 Nationally, 18% of people with disabilities live below the
poverty line, compared with 11 % of people without disabilities. 169 Perhaps
most disturbing is the notion that, despite substantial economic prosperity in the
nation during the 1990's, little, if any, economic benefit was experienced by
people with disabilities. Indeed, while the national unemployment rate fell from
6.6 percent to just 4.1 percent (between 1994 and 1999), the employment rate
for working disabled people appears to have dropped f\.Dm 28.1 % to 22%
during the same period. 170 If this is true, it suggests that people with disabilities
continued to lag behind non-disabled people both in obtaining employment and
168. us Census data from 2000 can be accessed on American Factfinder at the US Census
website: http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DatasetMainPageServlet?_Iang=en.
169. Id.
170. See Carolyn Lockhead, Collecting on a Promise, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., July 26, 2000,
at Al (reporting that the disabled say they are still in a fight for rights 10 years after the enactment
of the ADA). See also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabililies Act as Welfare
Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 1019-20 (2003) (finding that the failure of the ADA to
increase employment rates for individuals with disabilities may be due to restrictive judicial
interpretations); Hoffman, supra note 108, at 1241 (referencing other studies concerning the
employment of indi viduals with disabilities since the enactment of the AD,\ and finding that the
"news is not encouraging"). Note, however, that measuring employment rates of the disabled over
the life of the ADA is extremely tricky. The National Council on Disability has found that there is
an absence of reliable statistical data on disability employment levels. See National Council on
Disability, National Disability Policy: A Progress Report (July 26, 2002), available at http://www.
ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2002/progressreporC07-26-02.htm). Studies on this question have
been inconclusive because the results are largely dependent on how each stuJy defines and
measures disability. Compounding the difficulty is the fact that disability is self-reported and
individual assessments of work disabilities do not easily translate to disabling conditions actually
covered by the ADA's protections. Moreover, the definition of disability under the ADA itself has
been a moving target as Supreme Court decisions have increasingly nan-owed the statutory
definition of disability in a series of interpretative decisions. See discussion supra Part I.e. For an
excellent discussion of this difficult subject, see Peter Blanck et a1., Calibrating the Impact of the
ADA's Employment Provisions, 14 STAN. L. & POL'y REV. 267 (2003). See also Douglas Kruse &
Lisa Schur, Employment of People with Disabilities Following the ADA, 42 INDUS. REL. 31, 64
(2003) (finding that employment increased when using alternative measures of disability); Paul
Steven Miller, The EEOC's Enforcement of the Americans with Disabilities Act in the Sixth Circuit,
48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 217, 219-21 (1998) (noting that the number of people with disabilities in
the work force has increased since the passage of the ADA). Despite the difficulties in determining
whether individuals actually covered by the ADA have experienced higher or lower rates of
employment since the enactment of the ADA, it can be said with confidence that the "ADA has not
resulted in the hoped-for dramatic increase in employment rates for individuals with disabilities, and
two-thirds to three-quarters of this population remains outside the workforce." Hoffman, supra note
108, at 1244 & n.190 (citing Susan Schwochau & Peter David Blank, The Economics of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 271, 272 (2000). See also
National Council on Disability, NCD Progress Report (July 26, 2003), available at
http://www.ned.gov/newsroom/publications/2002/progressreporC07-26-02.htm (finding that
"whatever set of statistics one chooses from among the varying estimates of disabled Americans'
employment rates, the rate and level of employment for this population remain far too low").
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in earnings, even during the best of economic times. 171 President Clinton
acknowledged this sad reality when he said, "Not everyone has shared in the
American economic renaissance. We all know there are people ... who have
been left behind, including millions of Americans with significant disabilities
h k
,,172w 0 want to go to wor .
This lag in economic gain is particularly troublesome today as the financial
boom of the 1990s has ended and poverty is again on the rise. The U.S. Census
Bureau reports that the national poverty rate rose from 11.7% in 2001 to 12.] %
in 2002, resulting in an additional].7 million people in poverty in 2002. 173 The
median household income also declined by 1.1 %.174 The U.S. Census Bureau's
report addressing poverty in the United States confirms that 6.8 million families
lived in poverty in 2001 and that this figure has increased to 7.2 million families
for 2002. 175
With the overall poverty rate again on the rise, the disabled feel the sting
most severely. Even before the jump in poverty from 2001 to 2002, 29% of
people with disabilities lived in households with annual incomes of $15,000 or
less, as compared to 10% of people without disabilities. 176 By the same token,
only 16% of people with disabilities were like]y to live in households with
greater than $50,000 annual income, as compared to 39% of people without
disabilities. 163 People of color with disabilities are most impoverished. l78
171. Tomko, supra note 143, at 1033 (citing E. Scott Rcckard, Disabled are Behind in
Econolllic Boom, L.A. TrMES, Nov. 18,2000, at A I).
172. Id. at 1033.
173. u.s. Census Press Release (Sept. 26, 2003), available at www.census.gov/Press-
Release/wwwI2003/cb03-153.html. The Department of Health and Human Services' poverty
guidelines designated the poverty threshold for a family of four in 2002 as $18,100 in annual
income. 2002 HHS Poverty Guidelines, available af http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/02poverty.htm.
174. Id.
175. Id.; see also BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR & JOSEPH DALAKCR, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 200 I (Sept. 2002). In addition, poverty is also on the rise in
Pennsylvania, the eastern part of which constitutes the geographic service arca of the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania. The Philadelphia Inquirer reports that about 9.5 percent of
Pennsylvania's residents were living in poverty last year, up from 9.1 percent the previous year. See
Genaro C. Arms, Poverry Grows ill U.S. for 2nd Year, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 27, 2003, at A I.
176. TOlllko, supra note 143, at 1038-39 (citing Executive SUlllmary of the 2000 N.O.D./Harris
Survey of Americans with Disabilities, at hltp://w\Vw.nod.org/hs2000.html (last visited Scpt. 10,
2000)).
177. Id.
178. A study conducted by Katherine Seelman, director of the National Institute on Disability
and Rehabilitation Research (NIDRR), found that the average income level of the population as a
whole exceeds that of people with disabilities by 34o/c. Disabled people who are African-American
or Hispanic have even lower income levels than whites with disabilities. See Katherine Seelman,
NIDRR, study conducted in 1995 and cited in Beth Haller, Disahilify RighfS and Wrongs, HORIZON,
'II 35 (Nov. 1999) (reporting that in 1988 the average household income was $34,017, while the
average household income of whites with disabilities was only $18,000 and the average household
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Higher poverty rates are experienced by people with disabilities around the
globe where the causes of such abject poverty stem from many of the same root
problems as in the United States: exclusion from social, economic and political
life. 179
2. Being Poor Increases the Likelihood of Being Disabled
Being poor and disabled in America is a vicious cycle. Not only do
disabled people experience disproportionately higher rates of poverty, but being
poor dramatically increases the likelihood of developing an impairment. 180 A
recent General Accounting Office study concluded that 44% of all Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) recipients had a physical or mental
impairment. 181 "Poverty is the primary screening indicator of the many
variables that increase the risk of disability.,,182 People with disabilities are
twice as likely as non-disabled people to experience delay in getting needed
health care because they cannot afford it. 183
Moreover, families with incomes below 200% of the official poverty level
are almost 50% more likely to have a disabled child than higher-income
families. 184 Families receiving welfare benefits are almost twice as likely as
high-income families to have a child with a disability.18S Single mothers
receiving TANF benefits have a 38% rate of having a disability themselves.
This is more than twice the rate for higher-income single mothers. 186
The 2000 census found that 26.4% of blacks of working age, 24% of
income of African-Americans with disabilities was only $8,000), ar www.horizonmag.com/
poverty/disability-rights.asp (last visited Oct. \7,2004).
179. See Rebecca Yeo, Chronic Poverry and Disahilily 5, 9 (Aug. 2001), availahle al
http://www.chronicpoverty.org/pdfs/add.pdf (noting that studies in England, for example, show that
one-third of disabled adults of working age are unemployed).
180. Id.atlS.
18!. General Accounting Office, GAO-02-884, Welfare Reform: Owcomes for T;\NF
Recipienrs \t'ilh III/pairll/ellrs, 3 (2002), availahle ar hltp://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02884.pdf.
The General Accounting Office is a non-partisan research arm of Congress. See also TJlNF and
Disahilitl, - Importunce of Supporrs for Families wilh Disahililies in Welfare Reform (Mar. 14,
2003), availahle al htlp://www.ncd.gov/newsroorn/publications/2003/familysuppons.htm!.
182. Jennifer Pokempner & Dorothy E. Roberts. Pover,.y, Welfare Reform, and Ihe Meaning of
Disahility, 62 OHIO ST. LJ. 425, 431, n.24 (200 I).
183. Tomko, .It/pm flote 143, at 1036.
184. SLiNHWA LEE ET AL., DISABILITIES A. 'IONG CHILDREN AND MOTHERS IN Low-INCOME
FAMILIES (2002). (analyzing 1996 U.S. Census Bureau Survey of Income and Program
Participation. and finding that low-income single mothers are especially likely to have disabled
children and have disabilities themselves), available ar hup://www.iwpr.org (purchase only),
185. Id.
186. Id.
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Hispanics, and 16.8% of whites, report a disability.187 In addition, the
proportion of people of color with severe disabilities is higher than that of
whites. 188 "African-American children, who are twice as likely as white
children to be poor, disproportionately experience illness and disability.,,189
Foley and Johnson, two health policy researchers, report that "more than any
other factor poor health in individuals and populations is correlated directly
with poverty." 190 The presence of institutional racism, and its resulting barriers
to employment, housing, medical care, and insurance, expose people of color to
more health risks. The high incidence of AIDS/HIV, lead poisoning, and asthma
among minority populations illustrates a close correlation among poverty,
. d d' b'l' 191 M b f '1'raCism, an Isa I Ity. oreover, ecause poor ami les are
disproportionately female-headed,l92 women are at greater risk for suffering
illness and disabi Iity than members of the population at large. 193
In short, the close relationship between poverty and disability presents an
enormous challenge for policymakers. One legislative aide described the nexus
between disability and poverty in terms of two categories of people: those born
with a disability and those who become disabled later in life. 194 The former "is
born into poverty," the aide stated, and "the rest wind up in poverty after
becoming disabled.,,195
187. See U.S. Census Bureau. DisabililY Slalus: 2000, Census 2000 Brief. (stating that working
age is defined as ages 16 to 64), al http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/disable/disabstat2k
/disabstat2ktxt.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2003).
188. See Pokempncr & Roberts, supra note 182, at 434 (citing the 1994-95 Survey of Income
Participation).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 434 (citing MARIANNE FOLEY & GLENN R. JOHNSON, HEALTH CARE OF BLACKS IN
AMERICA'S INNER CITIES, IN HEALTH CARE ISSUES IN BLACK AMERICA: POUCIES, PROBLEMS AND
PROSPECTS 212 (Woodrow Jones Jr. & Mitchell F. Rice eds., 1987».
191. See id. at 435-40. Discrimination in the workplace, especially in low-wage, entry-level
markets, remains a substantial problem. Recent experiments have revealed that workplace
discrimination is a potent factor in the economic lives of black Americans. See David Wessel,
Racial Discril1lillmioll is Slill (/{ Work in U.S., 2003 WL-WSJ 3978719, Sept. 4, 2003, at A2. When
race is coupled with disability, barriers in the workplace invariably grow higher.
192. Female-headed families composed the majority (53%) ot' poor families in 1999.
Pokempner & Roberts, supra note 182, at 440 n.80 (citing Joseph Dalaker & Bernadctte D. Proctor,
U.S. Census Bureau. U.S. Dep't of Comm., Poverty in Ihe United Stares /999, (/\'ailable ar
http://www.census.gm/pmJI2000pu bs/pGO-210. pdf).
193. Id. at 440.
194. Diane E. Lewis, Access alld Closed Doors Despile Federal ACI, Number of Disabled With
No Joh is Rising, BaSTa, GLOBE, July 4, 1999, at G7 (quoting Connie Garner, advisor to Senator
Edward Kennedy, regarding a proposed work incentive bill intended to encourage workers with
disabilities to enter the workplace without having to risk their health benefits).
195. Id.
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B. Enforcement of Title I Protections by the Poor
63]
The close nexus between disability and poverty underscores the great stake
that poor people with disabilities have in the success of the Americans with
Disabilities Act. Adofting a civil rights approach to battling discrimination
against the disabled,19 Congress labeled people with disabilities as a discrete
and insular minority, identified them as isolated and powerless, and adopted
remedial and administrative provisions from the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
including a financial incentive for lawyers to act as private attorneys-general
assisting the government in remedying civil rights violations. 197 Congress
understood that civil rights enforcement is difficult and that a fee-shifti ng
mechanism would encourage individuals injured by civil rights violations to
k · d' . I l' f 198see JU lCla re Ie .
Despite such fee-shifting incentives, our study of filed cases demonstrates
that private lawyers have sharply reduced their involvement in Title I litigation.
Because the subject area holds such dim prospects of litigation success, the
small number of cases that are filed, presumably, are those that present strongly
documented facts and realistic potential for sizeable monetary recovery. But if
this is so, we wondered whether filed cases are likely to include the claims of
the poor, who tend to have modest economic damages and often poorly
documented claims, especially as they try to enter the workforce for the first
time or struggle to hold on to minimum wage jobs? And, if private lawyers are
not available, will the voice of the disabled poor be heard through the efforts of
public interest lawyers, government agencies, volunteer lawyers, or, as a last
resort, on their own through pro se filings? As previously noted, we looked at
almost four years of Title I filings in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania from
January 1, 2000 through December 1, 2003. In addition to studying judicial
outcomes discussed in part I, we examined poverty-related factors in these cases
from the docket entries and filed pleadings. For example, we reviewed whether
plaintiffs had filed their complaints in forma pauperis; whether they had
received free legal assistance from a legal aid or non-profit, public interest
organization, government agency, or pro bono lawyer appointed by the district
court; and whether they chose to proceed without legal counsel by filing iJro se
complaints. This comprehensive review revealed that poor people with
disabilities, by and large, are not litigants in Title I cases pending in federal
court and are not challenging employment discrimination in the workplace
196. For a discussion of the ADA's civil rights model, see Diller, supra note 6\, at 31.
197. The ADA provides: "The COlirt , in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party. _.a
reasonable attorney's fee, including litigation expenses and costs ...." 42 U.s.c. § \2205 (2004).
The ADA's provision was modeled in large part on the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976,42 U.S.c. § \988 (1976).
198. See Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 436 n.8 (1991) and Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises.
Inc. 390 U.S. 400, 401-02 (\968) (per curiam), both cited in Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 636.
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beyond the agency level. Apparently, the disabled poor who should qualify for
protection under the ADA do not feel empowered to confront disability-based
employment discrimination through federal litigation. 199
1. In Forma Pauperis
The federal in forma pauperis statute200 is intended to ensure that indigent
persons have meaningful access to the federal courts. By waiving prepayment
requirements, the statute enables low-income individuals to have access to
federal courts for redress of their rights.2° 1 Since the federal filing fee is a hefty
$150,202 the cost can be quite burdensome to a poor person living on a fixed
budget. Impoverished litigants, therefore, often submit sworn affidavits to
federal courts attesting to their poverty in order to obtain waivers of this cost.203
The granting of a request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFF) documents
the presence of a low-income litigant, although the absence of an IFF request
does not necessarily reveal the involvement of a non low-income litigant. In
some cases, lawyers may advance filing fees on behalf of their clients, without
regard to whether their clients might qualify for a filing fee waiver. Still,
lawyers who arc experienced in representing low-income clients are generally
quite familiar with IF? procedures and do not hesitate to utilize this simple
mechanism to waive court fees for their clients. For this reason, IFF filings are
a reliable, albeit not definitive, indicator of the involvement of poor people as
plaintiffs in federal litigation. Our prior review of IF? requests in Title I cases
filed between 1996 and 1998 revealed that less than I % of such cases were filed
in forma pauperis.204 We revisited this measure of indigence in our review of
Title I filings from January 1, 2000 through December I, 2003, and found again
199. See Hoffman, supra note 108, at 1250 (reviewing EEOC statistics and finding that only
15.3% of EEOC charges filed between 1992 and 2002 involved individuals with conditions most
commonly acknowledged as disabilities, such as hearing impairments, vision impairments, paralysis
and non-paralytic orthopedic impairments, suggesting that many of the most seriously disabled
persons do not attempt to enter the workforce and those who do may not feel empowered to combat
unlawful discrimination by seeking governmental intervention).
200. 28 U.S.c. § 1915(a)( I) (2000) provides that "any court of the United States may authorize
the commencemenr, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or
appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a persoll who submits an
affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses that the person is unable to
pay such fees or give security therefor."
20 I. See lody L. Sturtz, A Prisoner's Privilege to File in Forma Pauperis Proceedings: Mav it
be Numerically Restricted?, 1995 DET. c.L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 1349, 135R (! 995).
202. U.S. Courts, Frequently Asked Questions, Filing a Case, available at http://www.uscourts.
gov/faq.htm!.
203. Tomko, supra note 143, at 1053 (citing 28 U.s.c. § 1915 (1994»).
204. Rulli, supra note 75, at 376. Our prior study documenred a much higher IF? rate of court
filings for non-Title I ADA filings.
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a dearth of IF? filings. As the following chart demonstrates, the overall number
of IF? filings in Title I cases has dipped so low as to have almost disappeared
entirely from Title I litigation:
Year Total Number Requests for In Grants of In
of Title I Forma Pauperis Forma Pauperis
Filings Status Status
2000 98 1 I
2001 64 1 0
2002 70 0 0
2003 63 0 0
(through
12/1/03)
Of 295 newly-filed Title 1 cases during this time period, there were only
two requests for IF? status, of which only one request was granted, an IF?
grant rate of 0.3%. In other words, 99.7% of all Title I complaints were paid
filings. Surprisingly, no plaintiff has proceeded on an IF? basis since calendar
year 2000. While IF? filings dominate other kinds of civil rights filings
brought by the poor,20S the absence of IF? filings under Title I strongly
suggests that poor people with disabilities are substantially under-represented in
federal court litigation seeking to remedy employment discrimination.206
205. See, e.g., Howard B. Eisenberg, Rethinking Prisoner Civil RighlS Cases and rhe Provisioll
of Counsel, 17 S. ILL. U. L.J. 417, 420 n.8 (1993) (finding that in a pre-Prison Litigation Reform
Act study more than 95% of prisoner cases involved IFP filings).
206. There is a strong correlation between pro se plaintiffs and in forma pauperis filings. See
Jonathan D. Rosenbloom, Exploring Merhods to Improve Management and Fairness in Pro Se
Cases: A Srudy of the Pro Se Docket ill the SOlilhem Districr of New York, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
305, 323 (2002). The low rate of pro se filings in Title I cases in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, as documented in our sllldy, also helps to explain the extremely low rate: ()f illfomlCl
pauperis filings. Interestingly. our reviewal' all filed cases in the U.S. District Court for the
Southan District of New York during the three year period of 2001 through 200:> reveals a
similarly sharp decline in overall Title I filings. and in IFP filings as well, although they do show a
significantly higher percentage of IFP t'ilings generally. We found that there were ten IF?
complaints filed under Title] in 200 I, seven in 2002, and just one in all of 2003. These filings
reflect an IF? rate of 41.7% in 200 1,43.8% in 2002, and 25% in 2003. Undoubtedly, higher IF?
rates in New York are tied to higher pro se rates, as discussed later in this article, but they too have
dropped significantly, such that very few Title I cases are commenced IF? in the Southern District
of New York at this time.
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2. Publicly Funded Legal Services and Non-Profit, Public
Interest Advocacy Organizations
[8:2005]
Active legal representation by legal aid and non-profit, public interest
organizations that provide free legal services to financially qualified individuals
is, of course, a reliable indicator that poor people are able to secure counsel and
seek enforcement of their rights. 207 As noted, the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, and Philadelphia in particular, are home to many highly regarded
legal services programs and public interest organizations that have received
national and local awards for their advocacy of poor and disadvantaged
people.208 If poor people with disabilities are enforcing their rights under Title
I, one would expect to find that some of these organizations, and their
experienced staff attorneys, would appear as counsel of record with some
frequency. For this reason, our study of all Title I cases filed between January
1, 2000 and December 1, 2003 also looked at the lawyers of record, and their
organizational affiliations.
In our prior study, we discussed the importance of obtaining access to legal
representation and the disadvantages the poor face when attempting to navigate
federal cases on their own. 209 In the three-year period of 1996 through 1998,
we reported that only one Title I case was filed by a traditional legal aid
organization and only five cases were brought by public interest lawyers or
organizations.2lO We lamented this low involvement rate of the public bar and
expressed grave concern for the lack of access poor people have to counsel in
this area of the law.211 We were eager to revisit this question to see whether
access to free legal representation had changed with the passage of time.
Unfortunately, our current review reveals that access to legal representation in
Title I cases has not improved.
Upon reviewing all 295 Title I complaints filed from January 1, 2000
through December 1, 2003, we found no cases brought by a legal aid
organization and only five cases brought by non-profit, public interest
207. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Legal Services, Results and Capabilities 2002 (Feb. 2003)
(documenting thai 98,639 low-income clients and their families were provided with direct legal
representation by legal services programs in Pennsylvania), available at http://www.palegalservices.
org/annual_report/PLS_2002_report.pdf.
208. See, e.g., Allen Redlich, Who Will Litigate Constitutional Issues for the Poor?, 19
HAST! GS CONST. LQ. 745, 773 (1992) (finding thai the most successful of all legal services
programs is Community Legal Services of Philadelphia).
209. Rulli, supra note 75, at 375-385.
210. Id. at 378-79.
211. Our prior study found that legal aid and public interest lawyers brought only 2.1 % of the
Title I cases filed during this three year period. Rulli, supra note 75, at 379. During the most recent
four year period, that percentage dropped to 1.6%, with no involvement at all by a legal aid
organization.
I
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organizations.
212
The yearly totals were as follows:
635
Year Total Number Total Number of Number of Title I
of Title I Filings. Title I Plaintiffs Plaintiffs Represented
Represented by by Legal Aid or Non-
Private Counsel Profit, Public Interest
Organizations
2000 98 91 1
2001 64 61 0
2002 70 68 2
2003 63 61 2
(through
12/1/03)
These statistics confirm that virtually all Title I plaintiffs are represented
by counsel and that their attorneys are private lawyers, unaffiliated with legal
services or public interest organizations. Unquestionably, years of cutbacks in
federal funding to legal aid, along with restrictions placed on attorney's fees,
class actions and certain lawyering activities,213 as well as financial difficulties
experienced by non-profit, public interest organizations, have all combined to
decrease the role that legal aid and public interest lawyers are able to play in
civil rights enforcement in the workplace on behalf of the disabled.
214
212. An entry of appearance by a federally-funded legal services program would necessarily
mean that its client was impoverished under federal poverty guidelines, since legal reprc:sentation is
strictly limited by poverty guidelines published by the Legal Services Corporation. See 4S C.F.R. §.
1611.3 (2004). On the other hand, an entry of appearance by a non-profit, public interest
organization as counsel may signal. but does not necessarily mean, the presence of a poor persoll as
its client. Many private, non-profit, public interest organizations represent clients in litigation who
would not qualify for free legal services under federal guidelines where enforcement of thc client's
legal claims furthers the overall mission of the organization.
213. See Alan W. Houseman, Restrictions by Funders and the Ethical Practice of Lall', 67
FORDHAM L REV. 2187 (1999) (describing how Congress has closed the duur as well by
prohibiting legal services programs that receive federal funding from seeking or receiving attorney's
fees). The federal prohibition on attorney's fees leaves already over-burdened resources of legal
services program stretched even further, making it increasingly unlikely that such organizations can
undertake such time and resource-demanding employment discrimination litigation on behalf of
individuals.
214. See Julie Davies, Federal Civil Rights Practice in the 1990's: The Dichotomy Between
Reality and Theory, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 197, 262-63 & n.336 (1997); see also Houseman, supra note
213 (discussing the restrictions and examining their ethical implications).
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The four cases brought by a public interest organization during 2002 and
2003 were filed by the Center for Disability Law and Policy, a non-profit,
public interest law center located in Philadelphia that provides advocacy and
legal services to individuals with disabilities throughout Pennsylvania. 2lS The
organization provides legal representation to non-indigent individuals in a
traditional attorney-client arrangement, as well as assistance to low-income
individuals through a specially funded Client Assistance Program. The four
Title I cases filed by the Center for Disability Law and Policy sought to
vindicate important rights of the disabled, but did not involve poor people as
plaintiffs.216 For example, one case involved a claim of disability
discrimination brought by an assistant professor at a Philadelphia college who
had been denied tenure.217
Therefore, during the four-year period studied, only one of the plaintiffs
represented by a public interest organization in Title I litigation was
impoverished. 218 We encountered similar results in our review of Title I cases
filed in the Southern District of New York between 2001 and 2003, where out
of a total of 44 newly-filed cases, only one case was filed by a legal aid or
public interest organization.219 Undoubtedly, legal aid and public interest
organizations must make very difficult decisions about how to direct their
scarce resources; for the most part, they have decided not to litigate Title I
claims in federal court on behalf of low-income people with disabilities.
3. Attorney's Fees are Indispensable to Promoting Title I Enforcement,
Especially on Behalf of the Poor
The involvement of lawyers in Title I cases, especially on behalf of the
poor, is also directly affected by the potential availability of attorney's fees. As
215. See website of the Center for Disability Law & Policy, at http://www.equal
employment.org. (last visited Dec. 17,2003).
216. Telephone interview with Jamie Ray, attorney for the Center for Disability Law & Policy
(Jan. 8, 2004) (discussing Michelson v. Philadelphia Univ., 2:03-cv-04S05 (E.D. Pa. filed Aug. 4,
2003), Hassey v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 2:03-cv-04606 (E.D. Pa. filed Aug. 7, 2003), Griffin v.
Univ. of Pa., 2:02-cv-00249 (E.D. Pa filed Jan. 16, 2002), al,d Spivey v. Children's Hosp. of Pa.,
2:02-cv-08884 (E.D. Pa filed Dec. 4, 2002)).
217. See Michelson v. Phila. Univ., 2:03-cv-04504 (filed on Aug. 4, 2003).
218. See Beatty v. Temple Univ. Hospital, 2:00-ev-06470 (E.D. Pa. filed on Dec. 21. 200m.
brought by the Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia. The initial complaint filed in the district
court was a paid complaint, but following the entry of judgment in favor of the defendant the
plaintiff filed an appeal in forma pauperis to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
219. See Banchieri v. City of N.Y., et al., No. l:01-cv-01853, (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 2, 2001)
(involving the Urban Justice Center and Washington Legal Services, Inc., as counsel of record on
behalf of an impoverished plaintiff). Since March of 2001 (and through the end of 2003), our
research documents that no legal aid or public interest organization has filed a Title I case in the
Southern District of New York.
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previously noted, Congress intended that "people with disabilities should have
the same remedies available to all other minorities under Title vn of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964," including court-awarded attorney's fees to encourage the
active participation of lawyers in the enforcement of rights under the ADA.220
In our first study, we observed that relatively few Title 1 cases went to trial and
therefore benefits for plaintiffs were most likely to be obtained through
negotiated settlements.221 We discussed the vital importance of recovering
attorney's fees in negotiated settlements if plaintiffs were to have access to
counsel in such time-consuming and expensive litigation under Title 1. In
addition, we were sanguine about the future of attorney's fees in light of the
Supreme Court's pronouncement in Evans v. Jeff D.,222 which undercut the
position of plaintiffs and permitted, indeed encouraged, defendants to condition
their settlement offers upon attorney fee waivers. Over time, the Court's
holding in Jeff D. has profoundly affected settlement behavior by strengthening
the leverage of defendants and converting settlement negotiations into the
functional equivalent of personal injury negotiations, employing lump sum
offers as the rule. This has led to the under-compensation of plaintiffs' lawyers,
especially where damages are not the primary objective of the litigation or
where the measure of damages is not large enough to support a reasonable
, c 7)3
attorney s lee.--
These concerns apply with particular force to the claims of low-income
plaintiffs who are not able to insulate their lawyers from such defense tactics.224
Not surprisingly, the litigants most adversely affected by such economic
disincentives to attorney compensation are those who arc most vulnerable. The
poor and under-employed lose out because their low earnings yield damages
220. See H.R. REP No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 82 (1990), reprinred in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 365.
221. Rulli, SlipI'([ note 75. at 381.
222. Evans v. JetT D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986) (allowing negotiation of attorney's fees to take
plaee simultaneously with negotiations on the merits of pending claims).
223. See Davies, slipra note 214, at 199-200.
224. To try to amcliorate the effects of Jeff D., many lawyers rcquire their clients to sign
retainer agreemcnts that hold clients responsible for all attorney's fees incurred in the event that
they agree to settlemcnt terms that waive attorney's fees. Typically, thesc retainer agreements
provide for attorney payment on a contingent fee basis ancl, if fees are waived, a client is responsible
to pay the lawyer's lodestar rate for hours expended on the case. See id. at 215. However, this
mechanism is ineffeclllal if [he client is too poor to satisfy any such obligation and the settlement of
the lawsuit primarily involves equitable relief or very modest monetary damages. In such a case,
the lawyer obtains the primary objective of the litigation for the client but loses out, wholly or
partially, on an ability to recover attorney's fees. The result is that lawyers representing the poor
(both private lawyers and public interest lawyers) soon turn away from such time-consuming cases
when faced with little likelihood of sufficient compensation to warrant their heavy expenditure of
scarce resources. "[T]he amount of damages is a primary consideration in deciding whether to take
a case." See id. at 232-33. See also, National Council on Disability, supra note 88, at 14-15.
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that are too meager to offer adequate attorney compensation in settlements.225
Over time, attorneys stop taking their cases, leaving "the promise of civil rights
legislation more and more illusory.,,226 Justice Brennan's haunting prediction
that the Court's holding in Jeff D. would "make it more difficult for civil rights
plaintiffs to obtain legal assistance,,227 and to "vindicate their rights by means
of settlement or trial" has proven largely true.228
Our concern for the effectiveness of fee-shifting in Title I Litigation
assumed heightened proportions after the Supreme Court's decision in
Buckhannon.229 The Buckhannon Court's elimination of the long-approved
catalyst theory of attaining prevailing party status means that plaintiffs in ADA
cases that informally settle on terms wholly favorable to a plaintiff, but that lack
an entry of judgment or a court-approved consent decree (or some similar act of
judicial imprimatur), will no longer be entitled to attorney's fees. 230
Buckhannon has become a powerful sword for defendants to avoid or delay
compliance with Title I requirements, knowing that, if sued, they may settle
informally without having to incur the cost of attorney's fees. The natural
effect of Buckhannon is to silence the poor.231 In her dissenting opinion in
Buckhannon, Justice Ginsburg stressed the importance of attorney fee-shifting
to the enforcement of civil rights when she stated, "If private citizens are to be
able to assert their civil rights, and if those who violate the Nation's
fundamental laws are not to proceed with impunity, then citizens must have the
225. Davies, supra note 214. at 200.
226. ld.
227. Jeff D., 475 U.S. at 743 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
228. !d. at 741.
229. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Rcs., 532 U.S.
598 (2001).
230. See Dorfsman v. Law Sch. Admission Council, 200 I WL 1754726, at *5 (E.D Pa. ov.
28, 2001) (holding that a plaintiff who successfully settled her claims was not entitled to an award
of attorney's fees because a plaintiff must obtain judicial relief and not merely 'success' in order to
be deemed a prevailing party). See also T.D. v. LaGrange Sch. Dist. No. 102, 349 F.3d 469 (7th
Cir. 2003) (holding that settlement between parents and a school district in which the parents
achieved most of their objectives concerning the educational needs of their child lacked judicial
imprimatur and therefore parents were not prevailing parties for an award of attorney's fees under
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act); John T. ex reI. Paul T. v. Del. County Intermediate
Unit, 318 F.3d 545 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that the plaintiff, John T., was not a prevailing pany
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act despite having obtained a preliminary
injunction, a contempt order, and an acceptable individual educational plan) rev'g on other grounds,
2003 WL 22006810, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2003) (allowing plaintiff's attorney to recover partial
fees related to contempt adjudication).
231. See David Luban, Silence' Four Ways the Law Keeps Poor Peoplejrum Certillg Heard ill
Court, 2002-JUN L. AFFAIRS 54, 58 (May/June 2002). One study that included interviews with
practicing lawyers revealed that claims of low wage earners were not considered economically
feasible to litigate unless there was excellent proof of emotional distress or a potential for punitive
damages. See Davies, supra note 214, at 235.
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opportunity to recover what it costs them to vindicate these rights in court.,,232
The Supreme Court's narrow definition of prevailing party has closed the door
even further to access to federal courts for those least able to afford legal
representation.
4. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
[n our prior study, we discussed the importance of active EEOC
enforcement of Title I rights in federal court, especially for the poor.233 Apart
from the EEOC's adjudicatory role, Congress empowered the federal agency to
enforce the employment rights of the disabled through litigation, if necessary,
and it desired that the Federal Government play a central role in ADA
enforcement.
234
Therefore, our study focused on the prominence of the EEOC
as an institutional litigator to determine whether the agency aggressively
pursued meritorious Title I claims and filled gaps in representation created by
the economic realities of the private market and scarce public funding.
We were encouraged by our prior finding that when the EEOC acts as a
litigator, it appears to have a substantial, beneficial effect. The litigation it
brought in federal court on behalf of plaintiffs from diverse backgrounds and
employment settings produced tangible results that were documented in the
public fiJes. 235 Others, as well, have noted that EEOC participation can be an
important predictor of success for plaintiffs in ADA litigation. 236 Still, we
expressed great concern that the EEOC was not a litigator frequently enough,
having filed or intervened in only ten cases in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania over a seven-year period.237 We expressed hope that the agency
would undertake a greater litigation role in the future.
Unfortunately, our expression of hope went unheeded. Studying all cases
filed from January 1, 2000, through December I, 2003, we learned that the
EEOC was involved in only one federal case in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. 238 Instead of participating at a meager rate of 1.4 Title I cases
232. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 636 n..9, referencing S. REP. No. 94-10 11, at :2 (cited in
National Council on Disability, supra note 88, at n.118).
233. Rulli, supra note 75, at 387-88.
234. Id. at 385 n.235.
235. Id.
236. See. e.g., Colker, supra note 54, at 276-77 (finding that participation by the EEOC
improves a plaintiffs chance of success in appellate litigation. Colker found that a plaintiff's
predicted success rate increased from 2.8% to 18.0% in appellate ADA litigation when the EEOC
intervened as an amicus party).
237. The period studied was from July 26, 1992 until November 1, 1999. See Rulli, supra note
75, at 387 n.249.
238. The EEOC uses two categories to describe its involvement in federal litigation: direct
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per year, as the agency had done over the first seven years of the ADA, the
EEOC now participates at an almost invisible average rate of .25 cases per year.
The one Title I case filed by the EEOC's Philadelphia office in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania during the four years studied was brought on behalf of
a female account executive who earned $50,000 at the time of her termination
in 2000.239
These case statistics from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania suggest that
the EEOC has largely closed its doors to the poor and, for that matter, to all
victims of disability-based employment discrimination. The primary federal
agency charged with enforcement of Title I has abandoned its "central role" of
litigating in the trial courts to remedy discrimination and, thus, has failed to
sound a serious warning message that employers must comply with federal law.
Moreover, the EEOC's extremely low rate of involvement in Title I litigation at
the trial level in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania appears to be replicated in
other districts around the nation 240 For example, our review of Title I cases
filed in the Southern District of New York revealed that the EEOC had not
participated in a single case during the calendar years of 2001, 2002, and 2003.
In contrast, during the same time period, the number of lawsuits filed by the
EEOC under other federal employment discrimination laws increased,
suggesting that the EEOC itself may be backing away from Title [ enforcement
. h d" 24110 t e IstrIct courts.
5. Pro Se Filings
If public and private lawyers are unable or unwilling to enforce Title I in
federal court on behalf of the poor, low-income workers may still be able to
vindicate their rights by filing civil litigation on their own. Pro se civil litigants
are typically indigent and cannot afford counsel.242 In recent years, federal
suits ~nd interventions. Direct suit,; are thusc EEOC filings against an cmployer alleging
employment discrimination, while interventions arc those instances in which the EEOC joins an a
lawsuit filed by a private litigant. See htlp://www.<:eoc.gov/slats/litigation.html.
239. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, No. 2:03-cv-02200 (E.D. Pa. filed on Apr.
8,2003).
240 According to thc EEOCs own published reports of district court cases during the year
2000. [hc agency p~rticipated in only two Titlc I cases in Chicago, one Title I case in Ncw York.
and no Title 1 cases in Atlanta, Miami. or S~n Francisco. 1':ationally, the EEOC reported [hat it
p~rticipated in 25 Title I c~ses during 2000. while at the same timc it was invol\'ed in 127 gcnJer-
b~sed employment Jiscrimination cases and ')6 race or national origin employment discrimination
cases. U.S. Eqll~1 Employment Opportunity COlllmission, Legal Unit Summary of Lawsuits Filed
by Bases-Fiscal Year 2000, (lmilable al htlp://www.eeoc.gov/litigation/studyltable6.htllll (last
modified Aug. 13,20(2).
241. See National Council on Disability. supra note 88 (citing http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ ada-
charges.html and http://www.eeoc.gov/press/2-6-03.html).
242. See Lois Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts, Magistrate Judges, and the Pro Se
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courts have witnessed a "huge expansion of federal litigation" and a significant
percentage of increased filings may be attributed to pro se litigants.243 Studies
have documented a strong correlation between pro se complaints and civil
rights litigation, particularly in employment discrimination cases.244
In theory, pro se litigation serves as a safety valve for the poor who have
the least access to counsel to pursue their claims.245 While pro se complaints
can be time-consuming and troublesome for federal courts, and therefore
unwelcome,246 they also may reflect healthy confidence in the judicial system
among ordinary citizens that justice is obtainable, even without the help of
lawyers.247 Studies of pro se litigation can be helpful, as well, in detecting
inadequacies in our justice system. For example, a dearth of pro se complaints
filed under Title I, when compared to robust numbers of pro se complaints in
other types of employment discrimination litigation, might suggest that
individuals with disabilities face unique barriers to obtaining access to our
courts, beyond that of other unrepresented litigants, such as a fundamental lack
of awareness that such rights exist or a lack of confidence that their claims will
be heard. In particular, pro se statistics might tell us something important about
the nation's poorest workers with disabilities, since they are the group most
likely to be unable to obtain legal help.
Our study of all filed Title I cases in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
between January 1, 2000 and December 1, 2003, revealed very few pro se
complaints:
Plainriff, 16 1 OTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 475, 476 (2002). Many low-income litigants
appear without counsel because they cannot obtain counsel. Id. at 481 n.32. Studies of the unmet
legal needs of the poor suggest that over eighty percent of the legal needs of the poor and working
poor are unmet with currently available resources. Id. at 481 n.32. But see Spencer G. Park,
Providing Equal Access to Equal Justice: A Statistical Study of Non-Prisoner Pro Se Litigation in
the United Slates District Court for the Northern District of California in San Francisco, 48
HASTINGS LJ. 82 I, 823 (1997) (finding in Northern District of California in San Francisco that
"[s]eventy percent of pro se litigants did not even apply to proceed in forma pauperis").
243. Bloom & Hershkoff. supra note 242, at 479 n.19 (citing studies of prisoner pro se case
filings in ten U.S. district courts).
244. Park, supra note 242, at 823.
245. Perhaps this theory is illustrated best by the landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963), in which a pro se petitioner was successful on his state habeas corpus petition
before the UniteJ States Supreme Court, on certiorari, seeking appointment of counsel as a
fundamental constitutional right in a criminal proceeding. Id. at 343-45.
246. !'IO Sf! filings complicate the task of the judge, the magistrate, the clerk, and other court
personnel. Bloom & Hershkoff, supra note 242, at 480-81. See ulso id. at478 n.15 (citing Rya W.
Zobel, Ne\\' Srututes /\dd 10 Challenges Posed by Pro Se Cases in the Federal Courts, 9 FJC
DIRECTIONS I. I (1996».
247. In addition to prisoner pro se filings, federal courts have experienced a sharp increase in
pro se filings in social security appeals and non-prisoner civil rights claims. Many filings in the
latter category are attributable to employment discrimination, affected by fluctuations in the
employment market based upon economic downturns and the passage of new legisiation such as the
ADA. See Bloom & Hershkoff, supra note 242, at 481.
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Year Total Number of Total Number of Total Number of
Title I Filings Represented Pro Se Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs
2000 98 92 5
2001 64 61 3
2002 70 70 0
2003 63 63 0
(through
12/1/03)
These statistics document that there have been only eight pro se complaints
filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania from among 295 Title I complaints
filed during the four years studied, or a pro se rate of only 2.7%. Perhaps, most
strikingly, these statistics reflect that pro se complaints filed under Title I have
actually declined and that there has not been a single pro se complaint filed in
the past two years. Low-income workers with disabilities are not only unable to
obtain counsel, they apparently lack the requisite knowledge or confidence to
file litigation on their own. 248 This stands in sharp contrast to the rise of pro se
filings in other types of civil litigation. A review of prisoner civil rights cases
in three federal districts, for example, found that every prisoner case was filed
pro se.249 A study of pro se filings in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York, one of the nation's busiest districts?50
documented that 15% of all new ci vii filings in that district during 1999 were
attributable to pro se filings. and of those 12.7% were pro se filings in
employment discrimination matters.2S1 Our own review of newly filed Title
VII actions in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania documented a pro se filing
248. Another explanation might be that there is simply no client demand that is unmet.
Presumably, this argument posits that employment discrimination against low-income people with
disabilities has either ended or is now completely remedied by voluntary adjustments of eillployers
or by agency adjudications of the EEOC, while at the same time that disability discrimination
practiced against more financially-hec:led workers persists. In light of statistics retleeting that people
with disabilities have not made gains in employment over the life of the ADA, the authors find this
argument not credible.
249. See Eisenberg, supra note 205, at 490 n.8.
250. The Eastern District of New York covers the counties of Kings, Queens and Richmond in
New York City and Nassau and Suffolk counties on Long Island.
251. Bloom & Hershkoff, supra note 242, at 494.
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rate of 8.4%.252 Other studies of filed cases have documented the strong
correlation between pro se litigation and civil rights actions, particularly in
employment discrimination cases?53 With access to counsel so limited, one
might expect to find a sizeable number of pro se complaints among Title I
cases. Our study, however, documented that pro se complaints are
conspicuously absent from Title I employment discrimination litigation.254
6. Appointment of Counsel
In the infrequent instances when Title I complaints are filed pro se,
plaintiffs often inform the court that they want counsel and that they have
contacted numerous attorneys in an effort to retain counsel, but no attorneys
were willing to take their cases. 255 Believing that their claims possess merit and
that having counsel would make a difference to the outcome of their cases,
these pro se plaintiffs ask federal judges to appoint counsel for them.
Unfortunately, many will not receive legal representation.
A request for the appointment of counsel by an unrepresented litigant
makes good sense because having a lawyer does make a difference. A plaintiff
without counsel is much more likely to lose an ADA case than a plaintiff
represented by counsel?56 and having counsel greatly improves a litigant's
chance of settling a filed case.257 Studies of EEOC administrative decisions
also reveal that "having an attorney ha[s] a substantial effect on the type of
252. In utilizing the federal court's PACER document retrieval system, we found that
computerized access to Title VII filings in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania became available
only recently. We were able to study a full year of Title VII filings brought under 42 U.S.c. §
2000(e) during the time period of May 1,2002 through April 30, 2003. The PACER system reveals
that of eighty-three new cases filed under this cause of action statute related to job discrimination,
seven cases were commenced by pro se plaintiffs.
253. See Park, supra note 242 (concluding that non-prisoner pro se litigation tends to involve
predominantly civil rights claims).
254. As mentioned earlier, our review of Title I filings in the Southern District of ew York
from 2001 through 2003 revealed a higher number of pro se filings than in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, but they too declined sharply during that three-year time period studied. In 200 I,
there were ftfteen pro se complaints, in 2002 there were seven pro se complaints, and in 2003 there
werc only three pro se complaints. Unlike the experience in Philadelphia, where almost all Title 1
complaints were filed by lawyers, a sizeable percel1lage of Title I complaints in New York were
filed by unrepresented plaintiffs. However, even this changed radically: only one unrepresented
plaintiff filed a Title I complaint in all of 2003 in the SOllthern District of New York.
255. See. e.g., Donohoe v. Food Lion Stores, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 1319, 1321 (N.D. Ga.
2003).
256. Colker, supra note 54, at 276-77 (finding that one of the most important predictors of
success by plaintiffs in ADA appeals is having the assistance of counsel).
257. Rosenbloom, supra note 206, at 337.
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charge resolution experienced.,,258 A comprehensive study of the EEOC
administrative process conducted by Kathryn Moss and colleagues documented
that withdrawal with benefit rates (party initiated settlements) were significantly
higher for individuals using attorneys, as were beneficial outcome rates (right-
to-sue resolutions) and the size of monetary benefits received by charging
parties.259 Unquestionably, individuals with attorneys do better than those
. h 260
WIt out.
Since the ADA incorporates the powers, remedies and procedures
available under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, federal courts have discretion
to appoint counsel in Title I cases.261 Although Congress has given federal
courts this discretion, it has not provided them with special funding to
encourage their use of this grant of authority.262 As a result, the absence of
funding weighs heavily when federal courts consider whether to grant requests
?6~
for counsel. - .)
Nonetheless, federal judges should readily exercise their discretion by
appointing counsel when they are aware that an unrepresented plaintiff may not
be able to enforce a federal right without the benefit of counsel. To guide such
discretion, federal courts routinely examine several factors before deciding
whether to appoint counsel in an ADA case. Courts look to (i) the merits of the
plaintiff's claim in fact and in law; (ii) the plaintiff's ability to present his or her
case; (iii) the difficulty of the particular legal issues; (iv) the degree to which
factual investigation will be required and the ability of an indigent plaintiff to
pursue such an investigation; (v) and whether the case is likely to turn on
258. Kathryn Moss et aI., Unfunded Mandate: An Empirical Studv of the Implementation of the
Americans wiEh Disabilities Act by the Equal Employment Opporrunity Commission, 50 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1, 98-101 (200 I). Although the authors' research found that the overall benefit rate for
individuals with attorneys was nearly identical to the overall benefit rate for individuals without
attorneys, significant differences become apparent when right-to-sue cases were segregated for
purposes of calculating the predetermination settlement rate. Attorney involvement had a
significant impact upon right-to-sue resolutions (31.4% with attorneys compared to 7.4% without
attorneys).
259. Id.
260. While it is clear that results are more favorable when attorney representation is secured, it
is unclear whether the work of attorneys causes this result or whether attorney involvement simply
signals the presence of stronger cases. According to Professor Moss' study. EEOC staffers denied
that the involvement of attorneys influenced charge processing and outcomes, but this is something
that is very hard to gauge. See id. Moreover, it is likely from experience in other forums that
attorneys do help parties to ohtain better and quicker relief. See id. at 100-0 I.
261. Title va provides that "lujpon application by the complainant and in such circumstances
as the court may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney for such complainant." 42 V.S.c. §
2000e-5(t)( I )(2004).
262. See, e.g., Donohoe v. Food Lion Stores, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d j 3 i9, j 321 (2003) (stating
"the coun must keep in mind that Congress has not provided any mechanism for compensating such
appointed counsel. ").
263. Id.
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credibility determinations.264 As the first part of this article noted, Title I cases
are time-consuming, fact-intensive, and expensive to litigate. Even with
counsel, Title I cases offer a very low rate of probable success and, more times
than not, fail to survive aggressi ve pre-trial motions filed by defense counsel. It
is extremely difficult to navigate an employment statute that requires
individuals to be so disabled that they qualify for protection under the Act but
not so disabled that they fail to be "otherwise qualified" for the employment in
question. Individuals with serious disabilities, commonly thought of as
qualifying under the ADA, find, to their surprise, that they are not protected by
the Act because of restrictive judicial interpretations of statutory definitions. 265
In short, Title I litigation is a minefield for even the most experienced of
counsel, and, therefore, quite predictably, nearly impossible to navigate by
untrained and unsophisticated non-lawyers.
When these realities are coupled with the difficulties in obtaining counsel
in the private market, or from publicly funded counsel, one might reasonably
expect that federal courts would be eager to grant requests for appointment of
counsel in Title I cases. Indeed, apart from the usual considerations, Title I
plaintiffs may experience physical or mental limitations that hamper their
ability to investigate and marshal the facts, research the law, and provide the
court with a factual and legal basis upon which to obtain a favorable ruling.
Despite these compelling considerations, some federal courts continue to
engage in the fiction that counsel need not be appointed in Title I cases because
the claims before them "are not so complex" that plaintiffs cannot handle them
on their own.266 Inexplicably, these courts praise the competence of
unrepresented plaintiffs and justify their denial of appointed counsel on the
basis that the plaintiffs before them are adequately representing their own
264. See Snelling v. Covington. 1996 WI. 5 I5904 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (relying on the Third
Circuit's announced factors in Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
1196 (1994)). Although Tabron involved a request for appointment of counsel pursuant to the
federal in forllla pauperis statute. 28 U.S.c. § 191 5(d)( 1996), the same factors are routinely applied
in Title VII and ADA litigation. See also Donohoe, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 1321, (identifying three
factors: (I) plaintiff's ability to afford counsel; (2) plaintiff's diligence in searching for counsel; and
(3) the merits of plaintiff's case. The Donohoe court also noted that other jurisdictions sometimes
add a fourth factor examining the plaintiff's capacity to prepare and present the case without the aid
of counsel.).
265. See Diller, supra note 61. at 31.
266. Donohoe, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 1323. See also Haines v. Bethlehem Lukens Plate Steel,
1999 WL 718564, at '" I (E.D. Pa. 1999) (rcjecting request for appointment of counsel to an ADA
plaintiff on the basis that "the issucs presented in this cases are not complex, and the Court discerns
110 impedimcnt (other than a lack of legal training) to plaintiff's ability to gather and present crucial
facts"); Snelling, 1996 WL 515904 (finding that the ADA plaintiff, unlike a prisoner, did not have
his liberty restricted and therefore had the full opportunity and ability to secure counsel and
represent himself, notwithstanding that the plaintiff reported that he had contacted three attorneys
without any success).
646 The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice [8:2005]
. . 1" . 267mterests In ItlgatlOn.
It is no surprise that unrepresented plaintiffs fare worse than represented
litigants, as they confront difficult procedural rules and complex substantive
legal concepts that place them at the mercy of experienced opposing lawyers
who routinely appear upon behalf of employers.268 Consequently,
unrepresented plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases, as a whole, tend to
request appointed counsel at higher rates than in other pro se litigation.269
However, even when federal courts grant requests to appoint counsel, they still
may find it difficult to obtain lawyers who are willing to accept appointments
on a pro bono basis.
In the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the court maintains two pro bono
panels, the Prisoner Civil Rights Panel and the Employment Discrimination
Attorney Panel, and it actively encourages lawyers to accept appointments from
both panels. 270 In addition, the district court maintains a Public Interest Civil
Litigation Fund to provide limited funds to reimburse lawyers for out-of-pocket
expenses incurred for discovery costs, expert witness fees, and related litigation
expenses, and it conducts annual training sessions in conjunction with the local
bar, at which attendees receive continuing legal education credit.271 All of
these efforts are designed to enhance volunteer participation by the bar and to
promote the value of pro bono representation to the court, the litigants, and the
public at large, so that claimed violations of federal law may be properly heard
and adjudicated.
Despite these outstanding efforts, it remains difficult to obtain sufficient
levels of pro bono representation in employment discrimination cases. For
example, between July 1, 1996, and October 31, 2003, the statistical report of
the Employment Discrimination Attorney Panel revealed that there were 224
orders for appointment of counsel granted by the district court, but only ninety-
267. See. e.g.. Donohoe, 253 F. Supp. 2d at ] 319; Ackridge v. Comm'r, Dep't of Human Servo
City of Phila., 3 A.D. Cases 575, 1994 WL 18442] (E.D. Pa. May 5, 1994).
268. See Rosenbloom, supra note 206.
269. Id. at 332-33 (finding that in the Southern District of New York pro se plaintiffs filed
applications for appointment of counsel in 15.1 % of social security cases, 20.8% of civil rights
C:lses, and 39.7% of employment discrimination cases). The Rosenbloom study also found that
plaintiffs in civil rights and inmate cases received appointments of counsel more frequently than in
employment discrimination cases. Jd. at 334. At the same time. plaintiffs in employment
discrimination cases were able to obtain counsel on their own, without the court's assistance, more
frequently than in other areas. Jd.
270. See Rulli, supra note 75, at 380 n.216; see also Shannon P. Duffy, 3,d Circuit Forms Task
Force 10 Secure Counselfor Indigent Civil Litigants, THE LEGAL [NTELLIGENCER, Mar. 19, 1998, at
3.
271. The district court publishes Public Interest Civil Litigation Fund Guidelines to guide the
bar in securing reimbursement for qualifying expenses. (Guidelines on file with authors).
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five actual appointments.272 Unfortunately, these reports do not identify the
types of employment discrimination cases involved, making it impossible to
discern the percentage of actual appointments obtained in cases under the ADA
generally, or Title I specifically.273 It is fair, however, to say that pro bono
resources are limited and, at this point, insufficient to provide counsel in even
one-half of all employment discrimination cases in which the district court has
granted requests for appointment of counsel.274
EPILOGUE
When Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act amidst great
fanfare, it expressly found that discrimination against people with disabilities
persisted in employment, and that unlike victims of race, gender, or age
discrimination, the disabled often had no legal recourse to redress that
discrimination.275 Over time, this fundamental flaw in our legal system has
contributed greatly to causing people with disabilities to occupy an inferior
status in our society in which they are severely economically disadvantaged.276
To remedy this deficiency, Congress intended that Title I embody a "clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination" through
"clear, strong, consistent, and enforceable standards.,,277
In our current study, we examined official dockets and court records from
the full universe of filed cases in one federal district, and conducted more
limited review in several other districts, in order to learn more about the state of
Title I enforcement at the ground level in our federal trial courts. In particular,
we wanted to know whether, after more than a decade of experience under the
ADA, people with disabilities-and especially the poor-were finally able to
access the courts to redress employment discrimination and obtain meaningful
272. Report of Employment Discrimination Attorney Panel, United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, statistics through October 31, 2003 (on file with the authors).
273. !d.
274. Of course, there may be many reasons, beyond scarcity of resources. why individual
grants of appointed counsel do not result in actual counsel. There may be conflicts of interests that
preclude an attorney's involvement or, after reviewing the facts of an individual case, a lawyer may
determine that, in his or her opinion there is insufficient merit to warrant the lawyer's involvement.
Still, the Prisoner Civil Rights Panel reports that from July I, 1996 through October 31, 2003 there
were 259 orders for appointments of counsel, of which 174 resulted in actual appointments. td. In
other words, the bar accepted 67% of prisoner civil rights cases referred by the court for pro bono
representation, while the bar accepted only 42% of referred employment discrimination cases. 1£1.
The difference in acceptance rate may, in part, reflect a greater reluctance by lawyers to volunteer in
such difficult and time-consuming employment cases.
275. See 42 U.S.c. § 12101(a)(3),(4) (2004).
276. See 42 U.S.c. § 12101(a)(6) (2004).
277. See 42 U.S.C. § I2101(b)(1),(2) (2004).
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remedies, such that culture-shifting change in the workplace might appear on
the horizon.
Our examination of every filed case under Title I in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania for a period of seven years, supplemented by a review of ADA
litigation in the Southern District of New York and several other federal
districts, yielded several important findings related to Title I enforcement. First,
of cases which are resolved by judicial ruling in favor of one party or the other
(either at trial or prior to trial), employers almost always won. During the
multiple years studied, employers won roughly somewhere between 92% and
97% of the time. This incredibly high win-rate percentage for employers has
remained constant over the life of the ADA and shows no sign of changing.
Moreover, this finding based upon a comprehensive review of filed cases, is
completely consistent with outcomes noted in published studies of reported
cases under Title 1.
Second, our study showed that skewed outcomes and judicially created
obstacles are taking a toll on attempted enforcement of Title I through federal
litigation. Private lawyers are sharply reducing, if not abandoning altogether,
this area of practice, and the resulting decline in newly filed Title I cases is
striking. While the media persists in creating a public perception of a litigation
explosion under the ADA, actual court dockets show that Title I enforcement
actions are dying on the vine. Since 1999, the year of the Supreme Court's
Sutton trilogy, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has experienced a 48.4%
decline in newly filed Title I cases, and the Southern District of New York has
experienced a 94.7% decline. In real numbers, Title I filings have dropped from
124 to 63 in Philadelphia and from 76 to 4 in New York. The four additional
federal districts located in the Midwest that we reviewed experienced similar
rates of decrease in Title I filings. 278 For certain, private lawyers are backing
away quickly from Title I enforcement in our federal courts.
Third, our study showed that poor people with disabilities, many of whom
are seeking their first jobs or are trying to retain or advance in low-wag~
employment, are not seeking help from the federal courts when confronted with
employment discrimination. We were struck by the conspicuous absence of in
forma pauperis filings, pro se filings, and entries of appearances by lawyers
from legal services programs and non-profit, public interest organizations.
Clearly, poor persons with disabilities seldom use litigation as a tool to enforce
their Title I rights, and, when they do, federal courts appear reticent to appoint
counsel for them. Even when courts are willing to appoint counsel, more often
than not they are unable to successfully obtain counsel willing to enter their
appearances on behalf of indigent Title I plaintiffs. Finally, while the Equal
Employment Opportunities Commission plays a vital role in investigating and
278. The four large mid-western federal districts that we examined experienced percentage
decreases in Title I filings as follows: Western Missouri (55%), Southern Ohio (40.6%), Northern
Indiana (40.3%), and Eastern Missouri (37.5%).
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adjudicating claims of disability discrimination in the workplace, the agency
lacks a meaningful presence as a litigator in the trial courts. Our research shows
that the EEOC filed just one Title I action in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania over the past four years and it failed to file any Title I complaints
in the Southern District of New York over the past three years. In short, court
dockets reveal that agency lawyers, as well as private lawyers and public
interest lawyers, have backed away from Title I enforcement litigation.
Regretfully, these trends have disempowered people with disabilities. By
any objective measure, our federal courts are severely underutilized by people
with disabilities, and especially by the poor, when it comes to remedying Title I
. I' )79
VIa atlons.-
The legislative history of the ADA reminds us of what is at stake in our
federal courts:
[Limitations for people with disabilities] are not inherent results of
their handicaps, but are due to unnecessary barriers and
discrimination. Yet, year after year, these barriers persist, and they
take their toll on the lives of our citizens with disabilities. They are
not going away by themselves, despite supposedly enlightened
attitudes. State laws help, but are inconsistent and incomplete.
Voluntary measures, unfortunately cannot be counted upon to work.
Discrimination will sometimes be overcome by appealing to our
better instincts or rationality; but more often, it takes the moral
persuasion of the law to fortify those good instincts and rational
arguments. Once through the door and in the classroom or on the job,
people with disabilities prove themselves and are their own best
advocates. But as a nation we must make sure everyone can get
through the door. 280
As EEOC Commissioner Paul Steven Miller recently noted, inequality in
the workplace does not occur just randomly or by chance and therefore vigorous
enforcement is needed to end all types of discrimination.28 ! In the workplace,
however, enforcement is lagging and thus failing to meet the goal of corrective
justice.282 For federal litigation to be an effective remedial tool for people with
disabilities. more aggressive action will be needed to erase deep levels of
unemployment and poverty in our Iifetimes.283 But if poor people with
disabilities are unable to obtain counsel and are not empowered to enforce their
279. See 13100111 & Hershkofr, supra note 242, at 479 n. 17.
280. 134 CO. 'G. REC. 55106, 55116 (1988) (statement of Senator Simon).
281. See Miller, supra note 160, at 777.
282. Hoffman, supra note 108, at 1250.
283. See Mark C. Weber, The Americans with Disability Act and Employment: A NOIl-
Retrospective, 52 ALA. L. REV. 375,418 (2000).
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rights on their own, it is difficult to see how this will be accomplished in the
near future.
It need not be this way. Our findings derived from filed cases, combined
with the findings of others in studies of Title I litigation outcomes, confirm that
plaintiffs fare far worse under this statute than in other areas of law?84 In fact,
the reality is that few plaintiffs have succeeded under it,285 and so "there's a
long way to go.,,286 Employment continues to be the area with the widest gulf
between people with disabilities and the rest of the population.287 Although
there have been encouraging changes, some might even say sweeping changes,
in access to public transportation and public facilities that are visibly
empowering, and that may be nothing short of culture-shifting, the disabled feel
that they have been left out when it comes to the workplace. One leader of a
nonprofit organization that trains people with disabilities put it this way:
We've bypassed them [individuals with disabilities], and they've
become discouraged .... [T]he real break is that when they finally do
get a job, it's like watching a flower starting to blossom.288
The sad truth is that "perhaps in no area of public policy has the
expectations gap so stubbornly resisted our efforts to achieve equality.,,289
The resurgence of hope and optimism, evident at the time of the bipartisan
passage of the ADA, requires the rebirth of clear, enforceable standards that our
federal courts will uphold. After thirteen years, it is clear that Title 1 is broken
and the gateway to economic independence is clogged. Even citizens with
severe disabilities find themselves outside the protection of the ADA when they
turn to federal courts to overcome discrimination.290 As a result, employment
lawyers have filed far fewer Title I cases, leaving those who are most
vulnerable-the disabled poor-with virtually no access to counselor the
courts. This problem cannot and will not be remedied by our federal courts
284. Colker, supra nOle 54, at 257.
285. Erwin Chemerinsky, Unfulfilled Promise: The Americans With Disabiliries Act, 35-SEP
TRIAL 88, 89 (1999).
286. Vobejda, supra note 167, at A20.
287. Lewis, supra note 194, at G7 (citing the 1998 Louis Harris and Associates survc:y that
found that 71 percent of people with disabilities who are of working age were unenlployed in 1998,
5 percentage points higher than in 1986, when the study was first conducted).
288. Jd. (quoting Hank Cheney, president of Work, Inc., a nonprofit organization that trains
people with disabilities and helps them to find jobs).
289. National Council on Disability, National Disability Policy: A Progress Report (July 26,
2003), available at hllp:JJwww. ncd.gov/newsroomipublications/2003/progressreporcfinal.
htm#Employ ment (last visited Sept. 20, 2004).
290. See Diller, supra note 61, at 31.
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alone.291
Congress must revisit the Americans with Disabilities Act to restore its
original purpose and to provide clear, strong guidance to our federal courts in
order to promote the active enforcement of Title I rights. During the better part
of the 1990's, Congress reformed areas of federal practice that it believed
needed legislative attention.292 Congress can achieve the true meaning of
reform by making needed changes to the ADA that will bring the nation much
closer to achieving employment integration for people with disabilities. Legal
remedies under Title I should not depend upon medical minutiae relating to the
severity of an individual's impairment when discrimination prevents a qualified
individual from obtaining or retaining employment.293 While some scholars
have expressed understandable reluctance at the thought of asking Congress to
revisit the ADA in the current political climate,294 and, certainly, it is never
easy to ask Congress to fix an existing law,295 a national conversation on the
failings of Title I is now overdue. Elected officials should be reminded that the
ADA was the culmination of a strong, bipartisan effort that promised, but has
not yet deli vered, culture-shifting change in the workplace.
Effective civil rights enforcement will also require more encouragement
for lawyers to undertake the representation of victims of disability
discrimination. Congress should restore a sensible definition to the term
prevailing party in fee-shifting statutes, so that lawyers will again have ample
incemi ve to act as private attorneys general and be willing and able to vindicate
important federal civil rights. When plaintiffs succeed at achieving the
objectives of their litigation, either formally through judicial determinations or
informally through court-encouraged settlements, their lawyers should be fairly
compensated for the benefits they have obtained. As Justice Ginsburg so
291. On the day that the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Tenn. v. Lane 124 S.Ct. 1978,
1982 (2004), a case raising the issue of whether states may be sued under the ADA for failing to
provide access to courthouses and other governmental buildings, disability rights leader Andy
Imparato stated, "[TJhere has been a real disconnect between the sensibility that Congress had when
it passed the ADA and where a majority of justices stand on the issue." "If anything, the majority
sees these as luxury issues, not core civil rights issues." Stephen Henderson, Rights ofDisabled and
Slates Loom Large in High Corm Case, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Jan. 14,2003, at A2.
292. See, e.g., Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996).
The term reform is in italics in the text because, to some, newly enacted reform statutes, such as the
PLRA, were regressive measures enacted under the guise of reform. See Davies, supra note 214, at
246 (stating that the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which makes prison conditions
litigation much more difficult to pursue, is further evidence of Congress' antipathy to some types of
civil rights litigation.).
293. See Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law:
What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91. 164-
65 (2000).
294. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 108, at 1287.
295. Feldblum, supra note 293, at 164.
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poignantly explained in her dissenting opinion in Buckhannon, "[a] lawsuit's
ultimate purpose is to achieve actual relief from an opponent ... the judicial
decree is not the end but the means....,,296 If a court determines that a party
has achieved the result sought by the litigation, the litigant should be deemed a
prevailing party and be awarded attorney's fees.
Even these measures will not be enough to secure adequate representation
for poor people with disabilities, whose claims are too modest to attract counsel
in the private market. In these instances, public interest lawyers must be
available to fill the gap. Congress confronted a similar problem when it enacted
the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000.297 There, Congress was
troubled by a high rate of uncontested forfeitures in civil forfeiture litigation
and the real threat that poor people might be losing their homes simply because
they lacked sufficient access to counsel to defend their interests.298 To provide
meaningful access to the courts in these federal cases, Congress created an
automatic right of counsel for indigent homeowners whose primary residences
were the subject of civil forfeiture actions brought by the government. 299
Congress funded this right with special, earmarked compensation directed to the
Legal Services Corporation in order to ensure that representation of the poor
would be available when needed. 300 Congress should consider adopting a
similar funding mechanism so that low-income workers will have a lawyer
when they seek to overcome discrimination that prevents their access to
employment and economic independence.
Additionally, the EEOC must become a more active litigator under Title I
in the trial courts. The EEOC's own statistics reveal that many charges of
discrimination found by the agency to possess reasonable cause to believe that
discrimination has occurred do not result in successful conciliation at the
agency leve1. 301 What, then, becomes of these unconciliated claims? The
EEOC needs to devote greater resources and attention to obtaining relief for
these claimants.
In short, unless action is taken, employers will continue to prevail at
astronomical rates in Title I litigation, private lawyers will continue to file fewer
cases with each succeeding year, poor people with disabilities will continue to
be deprived of meaningful access to the courts, and, most importantly,
296. Buckhannull Bd. & Care Home. Inc., 532 U.S. at 634 (200 I) (Ginsburg. J., dissenting)
(citing Herwitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 761 (1987).
297. Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202, (codified at 18 U.S.c. § 983).
298. See Louis S. Rulli, The Lung Term Impact of CAFRA: Expanding Access to Counsel and
Encouraging Cremer Use of Criminal Forfeiture, 14 FED. SEKTENCING REP. 87,95 n.12 (2001).
299. 42 U.S.c. § 2996f(a)(11) (2004); see Rulli, supra note 298, at 95 n.28.
300. Rulli, supra note 298, at 95 n.29.
301. Moss et aI., supra note 258, at 98-101.
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discrimination in the workplace will continue unabated. The gateway to
financial independence through employment will remain largely closed to the
disabled. More than a decade after the passage of the ADA, people with
disabilities will still be left to wonder when, or if, they will see the
transformative change in the workplace that is finally occurring in other areas of
their daily lives.
